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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Banks and Banking-Joint Accounts-Rights of Survivor
A deposited money in a building and loan association. After his
marriage to B they went to the Association and had the ledger sheet
and passbook changed to read "'A, or wife, B." When A died intestate,
C, his son by a previous marriage, brought suit against B claiming that
the deposit belonged to the estate and not to B as survivor. The North
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment for C
by holding that when A deposits money in an account in the name of
A or B, in the absence of rebutting testimony of an agreement or a gift,
it merely creates an agency in B to withdraw such funds and upon A's
death the agency terminates and the funds become a part of A's estate.1
The case affirms previous -North Carolina cases. 2 What is interesting,
however, is the fact that when A and B changed the account they also
signed a signature card purporting to be a subscription for optional
savings shares for A or B, to be held as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Because B had failed to serve a case on appeal, the Supreme
Court stated that it would consider only exceptions presented by the
record proper and accordingly considered the exceptions addressed to
the conclusions of law made by the trial judge on the facts as found by
him. Thus the lower court's finding of fact that the signature card was
not executed for the purpose of transferring the old account to a joint
account with survivorship rights was held to be conclusive.3
This case still leaves open in North Carolina the question concerning the rights of a survivor to an account opened by A with his own
'Hall v. Hall, 235 N. C. 711, 71 S. E. 2d 471 (1952). While other courts do
not apply the agency principle to a similar situation, the same result is reached.
Packard v. Foster, 95 N. H. 47, 56 N. E. 2d 925 (1948) ; Philleppser v. Emigrant
Industrial Say. Bank, 274 App. Div. 1026, 86 N. Y. S. 2d 133 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
In some states an account opened by a husband in the name of husband or wife
creates a tendancy by the entireties. Hoyle v. Hoyle, 66 A. 2d 130 (Del. Ch.
1949) ; State Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Coleman, 240 S. W. 2d 188 (Mo. 1951) ;
Alcom v. Alcom, 364 Pa. 375, 72 A. 2d 96 (1950); Sloan v. Jones, 192 Tenn.
400, 241 S.W. 2d 506 (1951).
There is no tenancy by the entireties in personal property in North Carolina.
Turlington v. Lucas, 186 N. C. 283, 119 S. E. 366 (1923).
'Redmond v. Farthing, 217 N. C. 678, 9 S. E. 2d 405 (1940); Nannie v.
Pollard, 20S N. C. 362, 171 S. E. 341 (1933) ; Jones v. Fullbright, 197 N. C. 274,
148 S. E. 229 (1929) (certificate of deposit), noted in 8 N. C. L. Rsv. 73 (1929).
'The lower court found that the card was only for subscription of shares
which were not issued. An official of the Home Building and Loan states that
the card was a signing in respect to the existing account and that the term
"Optional Savings Shares" referred to the savings account. The actual shares
of the Building and Loan available for subscription are called "Full Paid Income
Shares." Recently the Home Building and Loan changed the paine "Optional
Savings Shares" to "Savings Account."
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money in the name of A or B, payable to either or to the survivor,4 and,
incidentally, the rights of A and B during the lives of both. Because
survivorship as an incident to joint tenancy is abolished in North Carolina, 5 the right to survivorship of a joint bank account must be founded
on some other grounds.
The rights of A or B as a survivor to a joint account have been
based on five theories: (1) trust, (2) joint tenancy, (3) statutory presumption of survivorship rights, (4) gift, and (5) contract.
(1) and (2) appear to be theories of the past.0 The lack of a trust
intent and of a trust res renders the trust theory inappropriate, 7 and
the creation of a survivorship account does not meet the requirements
8
of the common law unities necessary for joint tenancy.
'This is the scope of this note. The litigation usually arises in respect to
the rights of A's estate against the rights of B as a survivor for the balance of
the joint account. Thus A's personal representative tries to obtain all the balance
and B does likewise. There is a noticeable absence of cases where both A and B
have deposited money in the joint account. It can only be surmised that the reason
for this is that a personal representative of A will only bring an action against
B when he knows that all the money in a survivorship account was deposited by
A. Clearly B could show consideration from both himself and A in. creating
a contractual right in the survivor when he too has contributed to the account.
See Berrerick v. Courtade, 137 Ohio St. 297, 28 N. E. 2d 636 (1940).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §41-2 (1943, Recompiled 1950) ; Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N. C.
396, 42 S. E. 2d 468 (1947). Survivorship in personal property may be provided
for by contract. Taylor v. Smith, 116 N. C. 571, 21 S. E. 202 (1895). The above
statute abolishes the right of survivorship to real property in joint tenancies in
estates of inheritance but does not affect joint estates for life and estates by
entirety in such property. Burton v. Cahill, 192 N. C. 506, 135 S. E. 332 (1926).
Other States have similar statutes: ALA. CODE ANN. tit 47 § 19 (1940) ; ARIZ.
CODE ANN. § 39-110 (1939) ; CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 7096 (1949) (survivorship as
incident to joint tenancy is good if instrument calls for survivorship) ; FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 689.15 (1941) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1002 (1935) (same as Connecticut,
supra) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 51-104 (Burns 1951) (same as Connecticut, snpra) ;
ORE. CouP. LAWS ANN. § 70-205 (1940); R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 431 § 2 (1938)
(same as Connecticut, supra); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 7604 (Williams 1934); VA.
CoDE § 55-20 (1950) (§ 55-21 same as Connecticut, .upra).
' No case based on either of these theories has been found from an examination of cases decided in the past seven years where the formula was merely A
or B or the survivor. However, compare Hancock v. Savings Bank of Baltimore,
85 A. 2d 770 (Md. 1952) (A in trust for A or B payable to either or the survivor).
This seems to be the standard form for joint accounts in mutual savings banks in
Baltimore.
Joint tenancy as spoken of here is the common law tenancy which is created
by law and is not to be confused with a statutory joint tenancy as discussed at
page 98. See notes 8 and 14, infra.
For cases based on these two theories see 7 Am. Jun., Banks §§ 434, 435 (1937).
See Havighurst, Gifts of Bank Deposits, 14 N. C. L. Rnv. 129, 146 where
the following observation is made and supported by authority: "A more unusual
theory is that of a trust. Some of the cases announcing this doctrine fail to
indicate the mechanics of the application; what is the res and who is the trustee?
It must be that either the depositor, still the owner of the chose in action, in
this manner declares himself trustee for the claimant, or the bank is the trustee.
It has been pointed out that in any case this is a strained application. The bank
as debtor cannot be trustee and in any event the intent to create a trust is hard
io find." 8 N. C. L.*REv. 73 (1926).
See also 1 Scor, TRusTs § 58.6 (3) (1939) ; 1 BoamT, TtuSTS § 47 (1935).
'Strout v. Burgess, 144 Me. 263, 68 A. 2d 241 (1949); 16 WASH. L. REV.
105, 109; 48 C. J. S., Joint Tenancy § 3 c. (4).

1952]

NOTES AND'COMMENTS

The statutory presumption theory, (3.-),, stems from banking legislation. ,Today, when A makes a deposit for a joint checking or savings
account, most banks. furnish him with a signature card which must
be signed by both parties. These cards expressly provide that the deposit shall be payable to either or to the survivor. This is done pursuant to a banking statute which relieves the bank of liability to either
of the parties or to their legal representatives on paying either or, the
survivor.0 All forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have
such a statute. Thirty-six of these do not expressly relate to the rights
of the parties or the survivor 0 but at least four of these by judicial
interpretation create a presumption that the money is the property of
the survivor. 1

The statutes of thirteen states go further by expressly creating
property rights in the joint account. 1 2 Eight of these thirteen statutes
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 53-146 (1943, Recompiled 1950). "When a deposit, has
N

been or is hereafter made in any bank, trust company, banking and trust company,
or any other institution transacting business in this State, in the names of two
persons, payable to either, or payable to either or the survivor, all or any part
of the deposit, or any interest or dividend thereon, may be paid to either of said
persons, whether the other is living or not; and the receipt or acquittance of the
person so paid is a valid and sufficient discharge to the bank for payment so made."
Discussed in 9 N. C. L. REv. 14 (1930).
Even with the above statute, the bank cannot allow the survivor of a joint
account to withdraw the balance without retaining a sufficient portion to pay
inheritance taxes or interest which would thereafter be assessed under the tax
law; and if the account was in the name of husband or wife, twenty per cent
must be retained. Failure of the bank to comply with the provision, except under
certain stated exceptions, renders it liable for the amount of the taxes and interest.
N. 1C. GEN. STAT. § 105-25 (1943, Recompiled 1950).
oARiz. CODE ANN. § 51-516 (1939); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5831 (1949); DEL.
REv. CODE § 2270 (1935) ; D. C. CODE § 26-201 (1940) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 653.16
(Cum. Supp. 1951); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-2039 (1935); IDAHo CODE § 26-1014
(1947); I i.. ANN. STAT. c. 76 § 2 (Cum. Supp. 1951); IND. ANN. STAT. § 182001 (Burns 1951) ; IowA CODE § 528.64 (1946) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9.1205
(1949); KY REv. STAT. § 140.250 (1948); LA. REV. STAT. § 6-32 (1950); MD.
ANN CODE GEN. LAws art. 11 § 102 (1939) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 167 § 14 (Cum.
Supp. 1951); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 48.30 (West 1945); MIss. CODE ANN. § 5205
(Cum. Supp. 1950); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 5-528 (1947); Nm. REV. STAT.
§ 8-167 (1943); NEV. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 473 (1929); N. H. REv. LAWS c.
309 § 20 (1942); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 50-1003/ (1941); N. C. GEN. STAT. § 53146 (1943, Recompiled 1950); N. D. REv. CODE § 6-0366 (1943); OHIO GEN.
CODE ANN. § 710-120 (1938); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6 § 1180 (Cum. Supp.
1949); ORE. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 40-1003 (1940); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7 §819903 (Cum. Supp. 1951); R. I. GEN. LAwS c. 135 § 3 (1938); S. C. CODE ANN.
§ 7851 (1942) ; S. D. CODE § 6.0414 (1939) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 5935.1 (Williams Cum. Supp. 1952) ; TEX. STAT., REv. Civ. art. 342-710 (1947) ; U TAH CODE
ANN. § 7-3-47 (1943) ; VA. CODE § 6-55 (1950) ; Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 35148 (1945).
" lit re McIlrath, 276 Ill. App. 408 (1934) (prima facie contract rebuttable
by showing no intention to contract) ; Cashman v. Mason, 166 F. 2d 693 (8th Cir.
1948) (Minn.; rebuttable presumption that it is a gift of a joint interest);
Leverette v. Aimsworth, 199 Miss. 652, 23 So. 2d 798 (1945) (rebuttable by proof
of no intent to create joint ownership); Parkening v. Haffke, 157 Neb. 678,
46 N. W. 2d 117 (1951) (survivor takes unless terms of .the account are to the
contrary).
" ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 5 § 128 (2) (Supp. 1951); Ann. STAT. ANN. § 67-

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

provide a conclusive presumption that the owner intended to vest title
14
in the survivor.' 3 Ten of the thirteen create a statutory joint tenancy.
Even where there is a conclusive presumption of ownership in the survivor,' 5 the fact of joint tenancy is rebuttable during the lives of the
joint tenants;16 and in some of the jurisdictions creating joint tenancies and conclusive survivorship rights, 17 the fact of joint tenancy is
rebuttable as to any money withdrawn by the survivor during the deceased's life.' s
It is in those states whose statutes create a conclusive property right
in the survivor that the statute plays the dominant role in the cases.
Where the statute states no property right, or such right is expressed
but rebuttable, then the survivor must then depend on one of the other
theories to recover.
521 (1947);

CAL. BANKING CODE § 852 (1949); COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 18 § 45
STAT. 55 § 36 (1944); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 23.303 (Moore
1943) ; Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7996 (1939) ; N. J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-218 (1950) ;
N. Y. BANxING LAW § 134 sub. 3; VT. STAT. REv. §§ 8779, 8780 (1947) ; WAsH.
REv. CODE § 30.20.010, 30.20.015 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3205 (1949);
Wis. STAT. §§ 221.45, 222.12(9) (1951).

(1935); ME. Rxv.

(1) Alabama. No survivorship case found.
(2) Arkansas. Pye v. Higgason, 210 Ark. 347, 195 S. W. 2d 632 (1946).

(3) Colorado. Houle v. McMillan, 83 Colo. 216, 263 Pac. 409 (1928). An
expressed contract may be proved which is contrary to the signature card. Urbancich v. Jersin, 123 Colo. 88, 226 P. 2d 316 (1950).
(4) Maine. Presumption applies only to accounts in name of husband or
wife, or in name of parent or child up to $5000.
(5) New York. It may be proved that deceased depositor was incompetent
at the time of making the deposit to rebut the presumption. Application of
Hayes, 279 App. Div. 823, 109 N. Y. S. 2d 144 (Sup. Ct. 1952). This conclusive
presumption applies only when the money was deposited in a savings bank and
does not apply when made in a commercial bank. In re Duke's Will, 108 N. Y. S.
2d 875 (N. Y. Surr. Ct. 1951). See also WAsr. REv. CODE. § 30.20.010 (1950).
(6) Vermont. Stroh v. Duman, 84 A. 2d 408 (Vt. 1951).
(7) .Washington. In re Iver's Estate, 4 Wash. 2d 477, 104 P. 2d 467 (1940).
(8) Wisconsin. The right of the survivor is by virtue of a contract.
Schwanke v. Gavit, 219 Wis. 367, 263 N. W. 176 (1935).
California, prior to the 1949 Banking Code (note 12 supra), had a statute
which provided for a conclusive presumption as in the above states. CAL. GEN.
LAws act 625 § 15a (1937). Jorgenson v. Dalstrom, 53 Cal. App. 2d 322, 127
P. 2d 551 (1942). Under this old act it could be proved that the survivor was
to hold funds in trust for another. Jarkich v. Badagliacco, 75 Cal. App. 2d 505,
170 P. 2d 994 (1946).
Also where a confidential relationship could be shown
between the survivor and the deceased depositor, a presumption of fraud and undue
influence arose. Sodon v. Lichtenstein, 244 P. 2d 907 (Cal. 1952). No case could
be found interpreting the 1949 statute.
1 Arkansas, California, Colorado, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The Vermont statute, note 12 supra, states
that an "absolute joint account" is created.
'
See note 13 supra.
Cash v. Cash, 243 P. 2d 115 (Cal. 1952); Stark v. Central Savings Bank,
93 N. Y. S. 2d 805 (Sup. Ct 1949).
'" Compare notes 13 and 14 supra.
8 Paterson v. Comastre, 244 P. 2d 902 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1952) ; Morrow v. Moskowitz, 255 N. Y. 219, 174 N. E. 460 (1921) (Survivor may take the balance
but if he withdrew money during the life of deceased he may have to pay this
amount to the estate if it is proved A had no intention to create joint ownership
in the account) ; Munson v. Haye, 29 Wash. 2d 733, 189 P. 2d 464 (1948).
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A survivor who must base his recovery upon the gift theory, (4),
runs into technical difficulties. The basic elements of a gift inter vivos
must be proved-donative intent' 9 and delivery.2 Control over the
passbook by A may prevent the survivor from taking the balance.2 '
Some of the courts realize that only one person can have a passbook
at a time 22 and that the actual subject of the gift-money on deposit-

cannot be manually delivered.2 3 As a result, some courts have streamlined the gift theory by saying that the signing of the signature card by
both parties is prima facie evidence of a gift.24 Another traditional
problem, however, may face the survivor and upset his prima facie case.
A showing of a confidential relationship raises a presumption of fraud.25
The beauty of theory (5), contract, is that it does not have to depend
upon a statute or the interpretation thereof, upon technical requirements such as those relative to gifts, 26 or upon inappropriate property
law as concerns the unities of joint tenancies. 2 7 For these reasons,
28
this theory is being accepted by a growing number of state courts.
The contract is found in the words on the signature card. The theory
is well expressed in Hill v. Havens where A changed his bank ac"Olive v. Olive, 231 S. W. 2d 480 (Tex. 1950). Cf. Bulen v. Pendleton
Banking Co., 118 Ind. App. 217, 78 N. E. 2d 449 (1948). (Delivery of passbook
to checking account is not sufficient to sustain a gift since the depositor does not
thereby lose control over the deposit.).
For a discussion of
20 Ogle v. Barber, 224 Ind. 489, 68 N. E. 2d 550 (1946).
all types of bank account gifts see Havighurst, Gifts of Bank Deposits, 14 N. C.
L. REv. 129 (1936).
"1Packard v. Foster, 95 N. H. 47, 56 A. 2d 925 (1948).
22In re Fells Estate, 369 Pa. 597, 599, 87 A. 2d 310, 312 (1952).
"State Board of Equalization v. Cole, 122 Mont. 9, 16, 195 P. 2d 989, 993
(1948) (stated that the actual gift is not money but the co-equal right with
donor to exercise control over the deposit).
2, Drain v. Brookline Savings Bank, 99 N. E. 2d 160 (Mass. 1951). Link
v. Link, 65 A. 2d 89 (N. J. Ch. 1949). In re Fell's Estate, 369 Pa. 597, 87 A. 2d
310 (1952).
2 Nicholson v. Shockey, 102 Va. 270, 64 S. E. 2d 813 (1951).
2 Cuilini v. Northern Trust Co., 335 Il. App. 86, 90, 80 N. E. 2d 275, 277
(1948).
"'it re Wilson's Estate, 336 Ill. App. 18, 35, 82 N. E. 2d 684, 691 (1948).
Nor is there any worry concerning the statute of wills. See Chippendale v.
North Adams Savings Bank, 222 Mass. 499, 111 N. E. 371 (1916). The contract
creates a present vested interest. In re Kessler's estate, 240 Ohio App. 85, 85
N. E. 2d 609 (1949).
28 Crabtree v. Garcia, 43 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1949); Guest v. Stone, 206 Ga.
239, 56 S. E. 2d 247 (1949). (The Georgia court did not allow the survivor to
take because a statute allowing a third party beneficiary a remedy was not enacted
until after the making of this particular contract) ; In.re Wilson's Estate, 336 Ill.
App. 18, 82 N. E. 2d 684 (1948); Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa 920, 48 N. W. 2d
870 (1951) ; It re Fast's Estate, 169 Kan. 238, 218 P. 2d 184 (1950) ; Chippendale v. North Adams Savings Bank, 222 Mass. 499, 111 N. E. 371 (1916) ; Park
Enterprises v. Trask, 233 Minn. 467, 47 N. W. 2d 194 (1951) ; Gladieux v. Parney,
106 N. E. 2d 317 (Ohio 1951); Langoe v. Gianniki, 186 Ore. 207, 206 P. 2d 106
(1949).
For notes supporting the theory see: 17 U. CiN. L. Rxv. 402 (1948) ; 38 HARV.
L. Ra,. 243 (1924) ; 32 ILL. L. Rtv. 57, 70 (1937); 8 N. C. L. REy. 73 (1929).
2 242 Iowa 920, 43 N. W. 2d 870 (1951).
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count to A or B, as joint tenants with right of survivorship. In that

case the Iowa court said: "It is now the settled law in Iowa that when
a definite written agreement . .. is made by a depository bank with
its customers . . . such agreement is binding upon the bank and the

parties signatory.... The contract is that the bank will, in consideration of the funds with it and the creation of a debtor-creditor relation
between itself and its depositor, consider them as owners in joint tenancy . . . and that upon the death of either depositor any balance in

a0 The
the account shall become the absolute property of the survivor."
survivor's contractual right is that of a third party beneficiary"' or a
donee-survivor.32 When the contract is complete, stating that the
balance shall be the property of the survivor, parol evidence as to the
intention of A in creating the account will not be admissible unless there
is an allegation of fraud, deceit, duress, or mistake.as When both
parties are living, the form of the deposit is not conclusive and parol
evidence of the intention of the parties is admissible because there is
no question of survivorship rights.8 4
This leads to the incidental point concerning the rights of A and B
in dealing with the survivorship account while both are living. Where
the property rights of A and B are determined under statutes creating
joint tenancies, there is a rebuttable presumption that each should get
one-half; however, A may show that there was another agreement concerning the funds 35 or that all the money in the account was his property. 6 Litigation between A and B under the gift theory would depend
30 Id. at 929, 48 N. W. 2d at 876.
Note particularly the court's construction of

the joint tenancy contract that the bank will consider the depositors as owners
in joint tenancy. Query: Does this actually make A and B joint tenants with
respect to themselves or to creditors or other third parties during the lives of
A and B under the contract theory? A and B may not have contracted between
themselves for a joint tenancy. This would tend to support the theory of the
cases in note 34, infra, that during the lives of the parties, parol evidence is admissible as to the rights of parties or their existing creditors to show the realities
of ownership.
81 Rhorbacker v. Citizens Bldg. Ass'n Co., 138 Ohio St. 273, 276, 34 N. E.
2d 751, 753 (1941).
82 This name for the survivor was invented in Matthew v. Moncrief, 135 F.
2d 645 (D. C. Cir. 1943).
" Matthew v. Moncrief, 135 F. 2d 645 (D. C. Cir. 1943) ; Cuilini v. Northern
Trust Co., 335 Ill. App. 86, 80 N. E. 2d 275 (1948); Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa
920, 48 N. W. 2d 870 (1951).
3"Harrington v. Emmerman, 186 F. 2d 757 (D. C. Cir. 1950); Union Properties, Inc. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 152 Ohio St. 430, 89 N. E. 2d 638 (1949).
Logically, this seems unsound. If the contract calls for joint ownership with survivorship rights, why should parol evidence as to the intent of A in creating
the account be excluded when the rights of a survivor are in question but allowed
when determining the rights between A and B during their lives?
"Wallace v. Riley, 23 Cal. App. 654, 74 P. 2d 807 (1937) (that if A should
recover from an illness, B would transfer his interest in the funds back to A on
request).
." Stark v, Central Savings Bank, 93 N. Y, S. 2d 805 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
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upon B's ability to prove a gift of a joint interest in the account. If
proved, B would get one-half ;37 if not, A would be entitled to the whole
amount. When the rights of A and B are determined, during their
lives, by a court which uses the contract theory in survivorship cases,
it would seem that each party should take one-half if the agreement
speaks of them as co-owners or joint tenants. But it has been held that
the ownership is determined by the person who places the funds in
the account.38
As a practical matter, the ability of A or B to withdraw funds deposited by A in a joint account during the lives of both depends upon
who is in possesion of the passbook.3 9 To determine the right of A or B
to withdraw from the account, the nature of the account must be determined. Obviously, if no present rights are found in B, he would
have no withdrawal rights. Assuming that B does have an inter vivos
right to the account, this right may be interpreted in several different
ways. When either'party draws out the total amount, one result is that
the joint ownership is traceable to any new account ir which the sum
withdrawn is deposited, and if the withdrawer predeceases the other,
the latter takes the whole amount as survivor. 40 Another result of a
total withdrawal is that it severs the joint ownership and the withdrawer is responsible to the other for one-half.41 A third solution
is that each party bears the risk that the other will withdraw the whole
amount; and when this is done, it will destroy the interest of the
other. 42 Where more than one-half but less than the total amount
is withdrawn, it has been held that the money retains its joint character ;43 but where less than one-half was withdrawn, there is no such
44
joint right.
37
8 Goc

v. Goc, 134 N. J. Eq. 61, 33 A. 2d 870 (Ct. Err. & App. 1943).
Ulmer v. Society for Savings, 35 Ohio App. 525, 41 N. E. 2d 578 (1942).
"Of course if it were a checking account, either party could write a check

for the whole amount. This would not necessarily mean that the whole amount
would be treated as the property of such withdrawer. See cases in notes 40 and
41 in !ra. No distinction is made by the courts between savings accounts and
checking accounts in themselves; but as pointed out in note 19, supra, a delivery
of a checking account passbook does not meet the delivery requirement of the
gift theory.
(with40 State v. Gralewski's Estate, 176 Ore. 448, 159 P. 2d 211 (1945)
drawal made with manifest intention of defeating the co-owner's right). See
26 ORE. L. REV. 114 (1947).
"Clausen v. Warner, 118 Ind. App. 340, 78 N. E. 2d 551 (1948); Goe v.
Goc, 134 N. J. Eq. 61, 33 A. 2d 870 (Ct. Err. & App. 1943).
4" McLaughlin v. Cooper's Estate, 128 Conn. 557, 561, 24 A. 2d 502, 504 (1942).
This is based on the fact that the deposit agreement states "payable to either".
" Nusshold v. Kruschke, 176 Ore. 610, 159 P. 2d 819 (1945).
" In re Suter's Estate, 258 N. Y. 104, 179 N. E. 310 (1932). The court said
at page 310: "Joint ownership of a bank deposit does not differ from any other
joint ownership. Nothing in the Banking laws prevents one joint owner from
destroying the joint ownership in the entire deposit to the extent of his withdrawals of no more than his equal share for his own use. .. ."
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The pros and cons and the differences between the above theories
are not just academic in respect to North Carolina law on the subject. We have no authority on the rights of a survivor to a joint bank
45
Justice Barnhill, however, in
account made payable to the survivor.
the principal case furnished a lead when he said :46 "It may be that
in fact the account existing at the time Hall and wife visited the office
of the Building and Loan Association was the subject of the agreement
(italics added) evidenced by . . . [the signature card stating a right
of survivorship] . . . and that the fente 'defendant has a valid claim
to the balance remaining in the account at the time of the death of her
intestate. If so, she has failed to bring up the evidence so as to enable
us to review the findings of the judge in the light of all the testimony."
Justice Barnhill does not mention whether the agreement should be
between A and B or whether it could be between A and the bank for
the benefit of A and B. There is North Carolina authority to the effect
that survivorship may be the subject of a valid contract, 47 regardless
of the fact that survivorship is abolished as an incident of joint tenancy. 48 Also North Carolina has recognized third party beneficiary contracts.0 There seems to be no reason why the North Carolina court
For creditor's rights against money in a joint bank account see: Park Enterprises v. Trach, 233 Minn. 467, 47 N. W. 2d 194 (1951) ; Sitomer v. North River
Sav. Bank, 196 Misc. 870, 95 N. Y. S. 2d 402 (N. Y. City Ct. 1949); Union
Properties, Inc. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 152 Ohio St. 430, 89 N. E. 2d 638
(1949).
For death and gift tax aspect of joint bank accounts see: Petition of Hanson,
232 P. 2d 342 (Mont. 1951) ; In re Perier, 122 Mont. 9, 195 P. 2d 989 (1948) ;
In re Comb's Estate, 90 N. E. 2d 440 (Ohio 1949) ; In re Kleinschmidt's Estate,
362 Pa. 353, 67 A. 2d 117 (1949) ; SHArrOcx, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK
§§ 41, 42, 43 (1948); CCH INHERiTANcE, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX SERvicE-N. C.
1570 (7th ed. 1944); Op's. N. C. Atty. Gen., CCH INHERITANCE,
STATE TAX
17, 148; 17, 636 (7th ed. State Current 1950).
ESTATE AND GIFT TAX REPORTER 111
"In Hairston v. Glenn, 120 N. C. 341, 27 S. E. 32 (1897) there was litigation over a survivorship account but the court said that the question of survivorship was not before them because the survivor only claimed one-half of
the balance.
In a case litigated over the right to shares made out jointly with right of
survivorship, the survivor was not allowed to take the entire amount because
of failure to prove a gift inter vivos from the deceased. Buffalo v. Barnes, 226
N. C. 313, 38 S. E. 2d 222 (1946). A dissent by Justice Barnhill raised the
question concerning joint tenancy created by contract. For an analysis of this
case see 25 N. C. L. REv. 91 (1946).
,Hall v. Hall, 235 N. C. 711, 716, 71 S. E. 2d 471, 474 (1952).
Jones v. Waldroup, 217 N. C. 178, 7 N. E. 2d 366 (1940) ; Taylor v. Smith,
116 N. C. 531, 21 S. E. 202 (1895).
"See note 5 supra.
"Canestrino v. Powell, 231 N. C. 190, 56 S. E. 2d 566 (1949). This case
cites practically all the North Carolina cases dealing with these contracts. These
cases recognize the right of a third party to sue when a contract is made for
his benefit. If the bank paid the money into the estate, the survivor could bring
an action for it. If the bank paid the survivor and an action was brought by the
personal representative of the deceased against the survivor, the court could
easily hold that the survivor has received his benefit under the contract which
cannot be defeated.
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would not allow the survivor to take the balance as in Hill v. Havens,
supra, whether the contract be for joint ownership with right of survivorship or whether it be for payment to either or to the survivor. 50
There is a need today for a definite rule by which a person may
deposit money in a bank with the assurance that he can make use of
the money during his life and that upon his death his wife or some
,designated person may have funds to live on without waiting for the
administration of his estate. A recognition of the contract theory
could assure this. If this theory is not followed, then legislation should
be passed to make a conclusive right in the survivor.
CHARLES E. NICHOLS.
Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech-Motion Pictures
"Expression by means of motion pictures is included within the
free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments."' Thus the Supreme Court of the United States, in a recent
unanimous decision, overturned the thirty-seven year old precedent of
Mutual Film Corporationv. Industrial Commission of Ohio,2 and paved
the way for a substantial judicial rewriting of the law relating to the
official censorship of motion pictures, a practice currently authorized
by statute in eight states,3 and by ordinance in perhaps 75 cities. 4
The motion picture, from its early years a cause of concern to
municipal officials fearful of its potential for evil,5 was first subjected to
" Most North Carolina banks use only the words "payable to either or to the
survivor." The Home Building and Loan Association, in addition to this, uses
the joint tenancy feature. If the contract theory were followed, the survivor's
rights would be the same in either case; but if a dispute developed between A and
B over the account, B's chances would seem to be much better if joint tenancy
or joint ownership words were used. See notes 30 and 34, supra. For suggestions
in drafting joint account signature cards see: 1 PATON'S DIGEST; LEGAL OPINIONS
AND BANKING LAW §§ 1810, 1811 (1926).
1 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 72 Sup. Ct. 777, 781 (1952).
-236 U. S. 230 (1915), affirning 215 Fed. 138 (N. D. Ohio 1914).
'Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia. For current statute citations, see note 14, infra.
'Kupferman and O'Brien, Motion Picture Censorship-The Memphis Blues,
36 CORNELL L. Q. 273, 276 n. 24 (1951) ; Note, 39 COL. L. Rav. 1383, 1385 n. 17
(1939). For a comprehensive view of the development and operation of legal
film censorship see INGLIS, FREEDOM OF THE MOVIES (1947); CHAFEE, FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 540-548 (1941) ; ERNST AND LORENTz, CENSORED:
THE PRIVATE LIFE OF THE MOVIES (1930) ; Note, 64 A. L. R. 505 (1930) ; Notes,
39 COL. L. REV. 1383 (1939), 60 YALE L. J. 696 (1951) ; Comment, 49 YALE L. J. 87
(1939).

'Motion pictures were invented by Edison in 1889, and first publicly exhibited
in 1894. INGLIS, FREEDOM OF THE MOVIES 75 (1947). In 1909 New York banned
children under 16 from commercial movie theaters unless accompanied by a
parent or guardian. 1 N. Y. Laws 1909, c. 278. That provision remains a part
of the New York law. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 484 (1).
The circumstances under which films are normally shown-the darkened
theater, the freedom from outside distraction, the brightly lighted screen-all
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official censorship by a Chicago ordinance of 1907.0 This ordinance
required all films to be viewed and approved by the chief of police
before exhibition in the city, and empowered that officer to ban any
film which he found to be immoral or obscene. Pennsylvania enacted
the first state censorship statute in 1911, requiring that all films to be
shown in the state be submitted to the state board of censors, which was
directed to approve such films as it found to be "moral and proper, and
[to] disapprove ... films ... which are sacrilegious, obscene, indecent,
or immoral, or such as tend to corrupt morals."'7 Statutes patterned
after the Pennsylvania act were passed in Kansas" and Ohio0 in 1913.
The constitutionality of movie censorship legislation then in effect
was established in 1915, in consequence of a coordinated series of legal
actions, the most important of which was Mutual Film Corporationv.
Industrial Commission of Ohio.'° Facing for the first time the issue
of whether a state had the power to censor films, the United States
Supreme Court held the Ohio law to be a valid exercise of the police
power of the state. The court justified its holding that the statute
worked no abridgement of freedom of speech and press, condemnable
under the Ohio Constitution," by declaring that the movies did not
add immeasurably to the persuasiveness and allure of the movies, particularly
among children. Add to this the low quality of fare offered by the early movie
houses, and the apprehensions of parents and officials are more readily understandable.
'This ordinance was upheld as a valid regulation, under the charter of the
city, in Block v. Chicago, 239 Ill. 251, 87 N. E. 1011 (1909).
"Pa. Laws 1911, p. 1067, § 6. This statute was repealed in 1915, and replaced
by a statute (Pa. Laws 1915, p. 534) which has remained basically unchanged to
the present. For current citation, see note 14, infra.
8 Kansas Laws 1913, c. 294. This law was repealed in 1917, and replaced
by a law that was essentially the same as the present statute. See note 14, infra.
' 103 Ohio Laws 1913, H. B. No. 322, p. 399. Amended in 1915, the 1913
statute was superseded by the version now in force in 1943. 120 Ohio Laws 1943,
p. 475 at 481. See note 14, infra.
10236 U. S. 230 (1915), affirming 215 Fed. 138 (N. D. Ohio 1914).
There
petitioner appealed from the refusal of the federal district court to enjoin the
enforcement of the 1913 Ohio statute, which made approval by the state censor
board a prerequisite to lawful public exhibition of any movie film, and provided
that "only such films as are in the judgment and discretion of the board of censors
of a moral, educational or amusing and harmless character" should be licensed.
103 Ohio Laws 1913, H. B. No. 322, § 4.
The other cases of this related group were Mutual Film Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, of Ohio, 215 Fed. 138 (N. D. Ohio 1914), aff'd, 236 U. S.247 (1915) ;
Mutual Film Corp. of Missouri v. Hodges, 236 U. S.248 (1915) (validity of the
Kansas statute upheld); Mutual Film Corp. v. Chicago, 224 Fed. 101 (7th Cir.
1915) (Chicago ordinance held not violative of the United States Constitution,
Amendments 1 and 14); Buffalo Branch, Mutual Film Corp. v. Breitinger, 250
Pa. 225, 95 AtI. 433 (1915) (Pennsylvania statute held valid). All of these
actions were brought by film distributors, who purchase film prints from producers for rental to. exhibitors. Since exhibitors in jurisdictions where censorship is practiced refuse to rent films not approved for showing by the censor
board to which they are subject, the burden of censorship falls most heavily on
the distributor.
" Petitioner maintained in its bill and oral argument before the district court
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merit judicial recognition as a medium of expression worthy of constitutional protection; that a state might reasonably find in the harmful
potentialities of the movies justification for their restriction; and that
"the exhibition of moving pictures is a business pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other spectacles, [and] not to be
regarded ... as part of the press of the country or as organs of public
'12
opinion.
Within the protective constitutional bastions raised about it by these
-decisions, the practice of motion picture censorship developed in virtually complete freedom from successful assault. With the Pennsylvania act of 191513 as the basic model, six other states14 established
film censorship as a part'of their law, though only three of these later
that the statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution. See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 215
Fed. 138 (N. D. Ohio 1914). However, it apparently abandoned that argument

on appeal to the United States Supreme Court, and relied instead on the freedom

of speech and press guarantees of the Ohio Constitution, art. I, sec. 11, which
reads: "no law shall be-passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or
of the press."
" Mutual Film Corp. v: Industrial Commn. of Ohio; 236 U. S. 230, 244
(1915). The court further held that the Ohio law was neither an improper delegation of legislative power, nor an unlawful burden on interstate commerce. On
the authority of this holding were decided the - ther test actions cited in note 10,
supra.
" Pa. Laws 1915, No. 239.
" Maryland (1916), MD. ANN. CoDE GEN. LAWS art. 66A, § 1 through- § 26
(1939), as amended, art. 66A, § 1, § 9 through'§ 12 (Cum. Supp. 1947) ; New
York (1921), N. Y. EDUC. LAW § 120 through § 132; Florida (1921), FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 521.01 through § 521.04 (1943) (the Florida -statute, which establishes no
censor board, but prohibits the showing .of any film not approved by the National
Board of Review or the New York state censor board, was declared unconstitutional in State v. Coleman, Cir. Ct. of Fla., llth Judicial Cir., May 1, 1937,
49 YALE L. J. 87, 93 n. 41 (1939) ; however, this decision appears not to have
been appealed, and the statute is included in the latest codification of the Florida
statutes); Virginia (1922), VA. CoDE ANN. § 2-98 through § 2-116 (1950);
Connecticut (1925), Conn. Pub. Acts 1925, c. 177, repealed, Conn. Pub. Acts 1927,
c. 318, § 9 (the Connecticut act took the form of a revenue measure levying a tax
on all films licensed and making the fax commissioner the state censor) ; Louisiana
(1935), LA. STAT. ANN. § 4:301 through § 4:307 (West, 1951) (enacted to give
to the Huey Long organization effective control of film showings in Louisiana,
the statute appears not to have been enforced, due perhaps to Long's death shortly
after its passage).
The earlier statutes were amended following the Mutual Film cases. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 4 § 41 through § 58 (Purdon, 1930), as amended, tit. 4, § 59
through § 66 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1951); and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71 § 119 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1951); OHio GEN. ConE ANN. § 154-47 through § 154-47i
(Page, 1946), as amended, OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. § 154-47 (Page Cum. Supp.
1951); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-101 through § 51-112, and § 74-2201 through
§ 74-2209 (1949).
Massachusetts defeated a censorship law in a referendum vote in 1922, but
the same result is achieved through a Lord's Day observance statute (restricting
certain types of activities on Sunday); which vests censorship powers in the
bureau of state police. MAss. ANN. LAws C. 136, § 1 through § 4 (1950). Since
it would be impractical to circulate uncensored films for weekday use only, virtually all films are submitted for censorship. Comment, 49 YALE L. J. 87, 91 n.
31 (1939).
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statutes have been seriously enforced. 15 In addition, a substantial
number of municipalities have provided by ordinance for censorship of
movies. 10 Newsreels were held to be subject to censorship, where no
special exemption was extended to them by statute. 17 Although no
provision was made for motion picture sound tracks by existing statutes,

they were held to be subject to censorship shortly after their introduction in 1926.18
The New York motion picture censorship statute10 may be considered typical of those statutes now enforced. The power of film
censorship is exercised by the Motion Picture Division of the State

Department of Education. 20

It is a misdemeanor 21 commercially to

exhibit, or to sell, lease, or lend for commercial showing any motion
picture (with stated exceptions) 22 unless previously licensed by the

North Carolina appears never to have enacted a motion picture censorship
statute. Legislation of this type has been under consideration by virtually every
state legislature. Harrison, Televisioa and Censorship, 21 PA. B. A. Q. 128,
134 (1950).
There has been little federal legislation on the subject, despite frequent proposals of national censorship since 1915. INGLIS, FRaEroM OF THE MoviEs 68-70
(1947) ; Note, 60 YALE L. J. 696, n. 1 (1951) ; Comment, 49 YALE L. J. 87, 102
(1939). Currently a federal statute prohibits the importation of any "obscene,
lewd, lascivious, or filthy . . . motion picture film." 62 STAT. 768 (1948), 18
U. S. C. § 1462 (Supp. II, 1949). It is also unlawful to import "prints" or
"pictures" promoting treason or insurrection against the United States, or "other
articles of indecent or immoral use or tendency." 62 STAT. 718 (1948), 18 U. S. C.
§ 552 (Supp. II, 1949).
" The New York, Maryland, and Virginia acts are enforced. The Connecticut law was repealed two years after enactment. The Florida and Louisiana
statutes appear never to have been enforced. See note 14, supra.
"oAmong the cities which have some form of film censorship at present are
Chicago, Ray. CHICAGO Con § 1952 through § 1961 (1931); Memphis, 1 MEmPHIs DIGEST § 1131 through § 1139 (1931) ; Detroit, DEROIT CoMP. ORDs. c. 63,
§ 20 through § 22 (1945); Milwaukee, MLwAUKEE CODE OF Oas. § 83.2 et seq.
(1941) ; Atlanta, ATLANTA CODE § 5-305 § 58-107,8, § 66-504 (1942). See Note,
60 YALE L. J. 696, 697 notes 3, 4 (1951), for a discussion of the variant forms
which
municipal censorship takes.
1
Pathe Exchange, Inc. v. Cobb, 202 App. Div. 450, 195 N. Y. Supp, 661 (3d
Dep't 1922), aff'd, 236 N. Y. 539, 142 N. E. 274 (1923). New York and three
other states presently exempt "current events" films from censorship. N. Y.
EDUC. LAW § 123; VA. CODE ANN. § 2-106 (1950); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 43
(Purdon, 1930); KAr. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-103 (1949). An Ohio municipal
court recently held newsreels to be exempt from censorship under the Ohio
statute. [Raleigh] News and Observer, Sept. 22, 1952, p. 4, col. 3.
" In re Vitagraph, Inc., 295 Pa. 471, 145 Atl. 518 (1929); In re Fox Film
Corp., 295 Pa. 461, 145 Atl. 514 (1929).
"N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 120 through § 132. The present statute was enacted
in 1927 (1 N. Y. Laws 1927, c. 153, § 28), and supersedes the original act of
1921 (3 N. Y. Laws 1921, c. 715).
2 N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 120. The Director and other officers of the Division
are appointed by the Board of Regents. N. Y. Enuc. LAW § 120.
N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 131.
22 Scientific films intended for use only by learned professions, and films intended solely for educational, charitable, or religious purposes, or for exhibition
by an employer to his employees for their education and welfare, may be licensed
without examination, upon the filing of the prescribed application, including a
sworn description of the film. "Current events" films are entirely exempt from
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Department.23 Upon proper submission, 24 each film must be promptly

examined, "and unless such film or a part thereof is obscene, indecent,
immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its ex-

hibition would tend to corrupt'25morals or incite to crime, [the censor]

shall issue a license therefor.1
Where a license is denied, 26 both administrative and judicial review of such determination is provided.2 7 However, reversals by the

Board of Regents (the directing body of the State Department of Education, and hence of the Motion Picture Division) are rare, and apparently the New York courts have never upset a license denial by
the Department of Education. 28
This results largely from the rule
that on appeal from the censor, the only question open to the courtis whether that officer has abused his discretion. 29 So vague are the
censorship. N. Y. EDuc. LA w § 123. But it is within the power of the Motion
Picture Division to decide whether a given film shall be classified as "current
events" or not. Rollins v. Graves, 177 Misc. 39, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 510 (Sup. Ct.
1941), aft'd, 263 App. Div. 907, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 11 (1942).
" N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 129.
2" Application for a film exhibition permit must be made in a prescribed,
written form accompanied by a print of the picture to be licensed. N. Y. EDuc.
LAW § 127.
'" N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 122. For the Director's views on the purpose and effectiveness of the operations of the Division, see Alpert, Talk With a Movie
Censor, Saturday Review of Literature, Nov. 22, 1952, p. 21.
11 N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 124. If a license is denied, the censor must "furnish to
the applicant therefor a written report of the reasons for his refusal and a description of each rejected part of a film not rejected in toto." N. Y. EDUC. LAw
§ 122.
Exhibition permits may be revoked by the censor five days after notice in
writing is mailed to the licensee. Thereafter such film may be resubmitted for
licensing de novo. N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 125. Fraud in the license application
or affidavit, or any unauthorized alteration of the film after licensing, or conviction for any *crime committed by the exhibition or unlawful possession of any
film in the state per se works the revocation of any permit outstanding for such
film. N. Y. EDUC. LAw § 128. All advertising matter used in connection with
any movie must conform to the same standards as the film itself, and the use
of matter forbidden by the statute is sufficient cause for revocation of a permit.
N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 130.
" From the censor's denial of license, appeal lies to the Director of the
Division; from the Director's affirmation of the censor, to the Board of Regents,
or a designated committee thereof; and from an affirmance by the Board of
Regents, to the state courts. N. Y. EDUc. LAW § 124.
" Note, 39 CoL. L. REv. 1383, 1397 (1939). The Commissioner of Education refused to license the movie Birth of a Baby, finding it "indecent" and "immoral." The Board of Regents modified the Commissioner's determination, and
allowed exhibition for educational purposes only. It was sustained by the Appellate Division. American Committee on Maternal Welfare, Inc. v. Mangan,
257 App. Div. 570, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 39 (3d Dep't 1939). A New Jersey court
has held differently in a similar situation, ruling that where the presentation of
a certain film "would not be objectionable if conducted under non-commercial
auspices, it is not within the power of the defendants [censors] to revoke a
theatre license if the same film is shown under commercial auspices." Hygenic
Productions, Inc. v. Keenan, 1 N. J. Super. 461, 62 A. 2d 150, 152 (Ch. 1948).
" Midwest Photo-Play Corp. v. Miller, 102 Kan. 356, 169 Pac. 1154 (1918);
Rollins v. Graves, 177 Misc. 39, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 510 (Sup. Ct 1941),
aff'd, 263 App. Div. 907, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 11 (1942); Foy Productions Ltd. v.
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-standards to be applied that there will rarely be a total lack of evidence
to support the censor's determination.
From its pronouncement, the Mutual Film rule, and the numerous
federal and state decisions which followed it virtually without dissent,
drew sharp criticism from law reviews, 80 text-writers, 81 and motion
picture producers, 2 as well as from film distributors seeking relief
from the onerous restrictions of censorship. Extensive advances had
been made in movie production, both in the general artistic quality of
film dramas and in the technical processes of production. More important had been the increasingly frequent film treatment of ideational
themes-of political, social, economic and religious issues-which made
all the more objectionable the virtually absolute power of the censor
to determine what pictures a large portion of the population might
see. Yet the motion picture industry continued to be restrained by a
harness devised for the silent, one-reel, flickering product of nickelodeon days.88
Graves, 253 App. Div. 475, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 573 (3d Dep't 1938), aff'd, 278 N. Y.
498, 15 N. E. 435 (1938); Hallmark Productions, Inc. v. Department of Education, 153 Ohio St. 595, 93 N. E. 2d 13 (1950) ; State v. Clifton, 11 Ohio St. 91,
160 N. E. 625 (1928) (where censor refused to examine film of Dempsey-Tunney
fight and denied license for its exhibition, the court reversed his determination as
being unreasonable and arbitrary); In, re Franklin Film Mfg. Corp., 253 Pa.
422, 98 Atl. 623 (1916). Contra: Equitable Motion Picture Corp., 25 Pa. Dist.
114 (1916) ("This right of appeal ... is not limited to an inquiry'into the good
.faith of the board or to the question of an abuse of the discretion primarily vested
i'n them, but assigns to the court the duty of determining de novo whether or not
the reel in question . . . " is such as may be licensed. 25 Pa. Dist. at 115.
0 Kadin, Administrative Censorship: A Study of the Mails, Motion Pictures
and Radio, Broadcasting, 19 B. U. L. REv. 533, 552-554 (1939) ; Kupferman and
O'Brien, op. cit. supra note 4; Notes, 39 COL. L. REV. 1383 (1939), 60 YALE L. J.
696, 719 (1951) ; Comment, 49 YALE L. J. 87, 110-113 (1939) ; 15 COL. L. REv.
.5461 (1915).
' INGLIS, FREEDOM OF THE MOVIES p. vi (1947); EarST, TE FIRST FRuESTATES 540-548 (1941).
DoM 182 (1946); CHAFEE, FaEE SPEECH IN THE UNxTri
"2Early in 1939, Walter Wanger declared the time opportune to demand
for the movies the freedom accorded the press. N. Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1939, § 9,
.p. 5, col. 2. More recently, Eric Johnston, head of the Motion Picture Association, said, "We intend to meet the issue of political censorship head-on in the
highest court in the land. We're after a clear cut decision that will give the
screen the full protection and freedom guaranteed by our American Bill of
Rights." 36 CORNELL L. Q. 273, 278 (1951).
"3The objections' to film censorship are many. Rarely are its effects wholly
confined to the jurisdictions having operative censor boards., Producers must try
to anticipate the demands of the more important censor groups, with the result
that the whole American movie audience has its movie fare "censored" in the
process. The low salaries paid censors are not likely to attract persons "well
qualified by education and experience" for the job, nor is the political character
.of most of these positions any, assurance of the possession of such qualifications.
It is significant that after 1922, the nadir of movie morality, only two censorship statutes were enacted, one of these being quickly repealed, and the other
being deliberately designed as a political control measure. Apparently the efforts
of the film industry at internal improvement, beginning seriously in 1922, were
material in reducing the need for such official control.
The granting of full freedom from censorship to radio and television brought
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An avenue of attack not available to the opponents of film censorship at the time of the Mutual Film decisions was opened up by Gitlow
v. New York,3 4 where the United States Supreme Court first interpreted
the guaranties of personal liberty embodied in the First Amendment as
restrictions on state action. Yet, despite a Supreme Court dictum
noting the obsolescence of its 1915 attitude towards censorship, 35 both
state and federal courts resisted to the last all urgings that they administer to it the coup de grace.3 6
. Events leading up to the decision under consideration, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,37 illustrate certain of the dangers inherent in movie
censorship, particularly the responsiveness of the system to pressures
exerted by well-organized groups. Imported into the United States
without objection from customs authorities,3 8 The Miracle,3 9 a short
Italian-made picture, was combined -with two other foreign-language
films into an English-subtitled trilogy, Ways of Love. Licensed withthe illogical result that a given film, banned from the theaters of a state, might
at the same time be telecast from stations therein without hindrance. 48 STAT.
1091 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 326 (1947); Allen B. Dumont Laboratories, Inc. v.
Carrol, 86 F. Supp. 813 (E.D. Pa. 1949), aff'd, 184 F. 2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U. S. 929 (1951).
'268 U. S. 652 (1925). The court said in that case: "For present purposes
we may and do assume that . . . freedom of speech and of the press . . . are

among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." 268 U. S.
at 666. This protection has been specifically extended to newspapers, Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U. S.697 (1931), and Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S.
233 (1936); street distribution of leaflets, Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147
(1939); picketing, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S.88 (1940) ; public playing of
phonograph records, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); house-tohouse distribution of religious publications,Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S.
141 (1943); distribution of crime magazines, Winters v. New York, 333 U. S.
507 (1948); and the use of sound amplifiers, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77
(1949).
"5
"We have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are
included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment."
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U S. 131, 166 (1948).
" E. g., RD-DR Corp. v. Smith, 89 F. Supp. 596 (N. D. Ga. 1950), aff'd, 183
F. 2d 562 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S.853 (1950) ; Gelling v. Texas,
247 S.W. 2d 95 (Tex. Cr. App. 1952), reversed, 343 U. S.960 (1952).
' 343 U. S.495, 72 Sup. Ct. 777 (1952).
'

To import "any obscene, lewd, lascivious or filthy ...

motion picture film"

wast at that time a criminal offense under 35 STAT. 1138 (1909), 18 U. S. C.
§ 396 (1947). The importation of any obscene "print" or "picture" was also
barred. 46 STAT. 688 (1930), 19 U. S. C. § 1305 (1947).
" Produced in Italy under the direction of Roberto Rossellini in 1948, The
Miracle isthe story of a demented Italian peasant girl who ismade drunk, seduced, and then immediately abandoned by a stranger whom she believes to be
St. Joseph. Her resulting pregnancy she declares to be of divine origin; in
answer to this proclamation, her companions taunt and mock her cruelly. The
narration makes clear the association, in the mind of the girl, of her own experience with the Virgin Birth. The film ends with the birth of her child in a
deserted hillside chapel. Crowther, The Strange Case of "The Miracle," Atlantic Monthly, April 1951, p. 35, 36-37.
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out difficulty,40 the trilogy opened at the Paris Theatre in New York
City on December 12, 1950.41 Immediately attacked by the National
Legion of Decency as "a sacrilegious and blasphemous mockery of
Christian religious truth,"' 4 The Miracle was officially condemned by
Cardinal Spellman, 43 and the Paris Theatre picketed by members of
44
the Catholic War Veterans organization and other Catholic lay groups.
In response to extensive protests against the showing of The Miracle
(though it was strongly defended both by Protestant clergymen and
by some Catholics), the Board of Regents, having viewed the film
and found it to be "sacrilegious" and therefore barred under the terms
of the statute, 45 ordered its exhibition permits revoked. 4 The distributor of the film took the Regent's determination into the New York
courts for review. Both the Appellate Division 47 and the Court of
'0 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 72 Sup. Ct. 777, 785 (1952). The censor
'could have refused to issue an exhibition permit had he found the film "sacrilegious." N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 122.
"'Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 72 Sup. Ct. 777, 785 (1952).
N. Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1950, p. 23, col. 4.
N. Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1951, p. 1, col. 2.
"Crowther, supra note 39, at 38. "The most logical assumption, on the face
of the evidence, is that The Miracle became an issue after it opened in New York,
and that the Catholic artillery was assembled in mounting arrays as it was seen
that the distributor and the theatre were far from minded to heed the special
objections of the Church." Id. at 36.
Italian Catholic critics disagreed as to whether The Miracle was sacrilegious.
Although possessed of the power to ban the movie from Italy, the Vatican did
not do so, and it was widely distributed there. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
72 Sup. Ct. 777, 784-785 (1952). American Catholic opinion was by no means
united. Allen Tate, well-known Catholic poet and critic, observed, "in the long
run what Cardinal Spellman will have succeeded in doing is insulting the intelligence and faith of American Catholics with the assumption that a second-rate
motion picture could in any way undermine their morals or shake their faith."
N. Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1951, p. 24, col. 7.
As a part of the effort to halt its showing. The Miracle was declared by the
New York City Commissioner of Licenses to be "blasphemous," and a revocation of
the exhibiting theater's license was threatened, should the film not be withdrawn.
A New York court quickly found the Commissioner to have exceeded his authority
in this instance. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. McCaffrey, 198 Misc. 884, 101 N. Y. S.
2d 892 (Sup. Ct. 1952). New York, following the majority rule, holds that
state censorship precludes censorship by local authorities, See Note, 126 A. L. R.
13635 (1940).
" N. Y. EDUC. LAW

§

122.

N. Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1951, p. 9, col. 2. A committee of the Board of Regents had previously viewed the film and, despite protests of the licensee that
it was without authority to do so, had recommended revocation of the license.
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 72 Sup. Ct. 777, 779 (1952). The statute authorizes revocation only by the Director or other person authorized to issue such
permits.
N. Y. EDtc. LAW § 125.
' 7 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 278 App. Div. 253, 104 N. Y. S. 2d 740
(3d Dep't 1951). Appellant contended that the New York statute under which
The Miracle was banned was invalid on three counts: (1) it was a previous
restraint on freedom of speech and of the press, prohibited both by the New York
Constitution, art. I, § 8, and by the United States Constitution, Amendments I
and 14; (2) the term "sacrilegious" was so vague as to violate the demands of
due process of law; and (3) the statute constituted an infringement on the guaranty of separation of Church and State.
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Appeals, 48 relying primarily on the Mutual Film precedent, sustained
the license revocation as against all contentions of appellant.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in tleciding the case on
appeal49 from the courts of New York, limited itself to consideration
of the issue of whether the alleged abridgement of the freedoms of
speech and of the press was violative of the federal constitution. Mr.
Justice Clark, speaking for the court, dispatched with incisive brevity
each of the main elements of the Mutual Film rationale. That the
movies may be designed to entertain as well as to inform was found
to be no contradiction of their status as a significant medium for the
communication of ideas. The profit motive of the motion picture industry was -declared to have no relevance to the movies' claim to constitutional protection; as the court observed, the business character of
book and newspaper publishing has never been accounted material in
determining the scope of their freedom. The allegedly superior capacity
for evil possessed by the films was found to be of possible relevance in
determining the scope of community control which should be permitted,
but it was n6t viewed as authorization for "substantially unbridled
censorship such as we have here."5 ° Having thus rejected the chief
arguments in support of the Mutual rule, the court for the first time
declared that motion pictures lie within the protective embrace of the
freedom of expression guaranties of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.'
Yet, Mr. Justice Clark continued, "It does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of
every kind at all times and all places."15 2 Nor are the movies necessarily
subject to precisely the same rules as govern other modes of expression. But the First Amendment makes freedom of expression the rule,
and the burden is now upon the censoring jurisdiction to justify any
restraint which it imposes. 3
Turning to the specific wording of the New York statute under
which The Miracle was banned, the court discovered in the statutory
Briefs as amici curiae were filed by the New York Civil Liberties Committee
and the National Council on Freedom from Censorship on behalf of appellant,
and by the New York State Catholic Welfare Committee on behalf of appellees.
sJoseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 303 N. Y. 242, 101 N. E. 2d 665 (1951).
Two judges favored reversal of the Regents. order.
,"Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 72 Sup. Ct. 777 (1952). See Extracts from
Briefs to the United States Supreme Court in.
Burstyn v. Wilson, et al., 12 LAw.
GUILD Rxv., 82 (1952).
"1 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 72 Sup. Ct. 777, 781 (1952).
Id. at 783.
L2Id. at 781. The Supreme Court has frequently held that freedom of expression is not absolute. E. g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S.315 (1951) ; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S.77 (1949); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S.
568 (1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931).
"' Joseph Burstyn. Inc. v. Wilson, 72 Sup. Ct. 777, 781 (1952).
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condemnation of "sacrilegious" movies no narrow, explicit, and justifiable exception to the rule of freedom just enunciated. The term "sacrilegious" was found to be so vague that "the censor is set adrift upon
a boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious views,
with no charts but those provided by the most vocal and powerful orthodoxies."54 But vagueness was not the only defect in the New York
law. Said the court, "The state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is suf'
ficient to justify prior restraints upon the expression of those views."5
Thus the court actually limited itself in terms to the holding that "a
state may not ban a film on the basis of a censor's conclusion that it
is 'sacrilegious.' "56
Where then -does the law stand today, in the light of the Miracle
decision, with regard to the official censorship of motion pictures? Obviously those statutes and ordinances which authorize the banning of
films found by a censor to be "sacrilegious" 57 are to that extent invalid.
Furthermore, much of the present legislation is highly vulnerable, in
whole or in part, in that it is so vague as to provide the censor with
no intelligible working criteria. 58 The Supreme Court has indicated
" Id.at 782.
"Ibid. The New York Court of Appeals had said, "There is nothing mysterious about the standard [sacrilegious] to be applied. It is simply this: that
no religion, as that word is understood by the ordinary, reasonable person, shall
be treated with contempt, mockery, scorn and ridicule to the extent that it has
been here, by those engaged inselling entertainment by way of motion pictures."
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 303 N. Y. 242, 101 N. E. 2d 665, 672 (1951).
"Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 72 Sup. Ct. 777, 783 (1952). As Mr. Justice Reed pointed out in a concurring opinion, this narrow holding means that
the court must measure the facts of each license denial against the principles of
the First Amendment to determine its permissibility. Ibid.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter dwelled lengthily on the
etymology of the word "sacrilegious," which appears never to have received
judicial definition prior to the instant case. Consequently neither court nor censor
could know what was condemnable under that term. To offer to all 300 religious sects of the United States protection from any offense, as proposed by
the New York courts, would have the effect, he pointed out, of extending such
protection only to those groups capable of raising a politically substantial outcry,
as in the present case. Id. at 783.
l MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 66A, § 6 (1939); N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 122;
PA. STAr. AxiN. tit. 4, § 43 (Purdon, 1930).
" E. g., the Ohio law allows the showing of "only such films as are . . .of
a moral, educational or amusing and harmless character. . . . " OHio GEr. CODE
ANN. § 154-47b (Page, 1946). The Louisiana statute employs exactly the same
standards. LA. STAT. ANN. § 4:304 (West, 1951).
Since the Miracle decision, the United States Supreme Court has reversed
the conviction in a state court of an appellant who exhibited Pinky after it was
banned under a Marshall, Texas, ordinance which authorized the local censor
board to deny an exhibition permit to any film which, in its opinion, was "of
such character as to be prejudicial to the best interests of the people of said
City." Gelling v. Texas, 343 U. S. 960, 72 Sup. Ct. 1002 (1952) (memorandum
decision), reversing 247 S. W. 2d 95 (Tex. Cr. App. 1952). Frankfurter, J.,
concurring, noted that the ordinance offended the due process of law clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment on the score of "indefiniteness." 72 Sup. Ct. 1002.
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that it might approve statutes including as standards "words well understood through long use in the criminal law-obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, indecent, or disgusting. '59 Such general phrases as "tend to
debase or corrupt morals," 60 or "tend to corrupt morals or incite to
crime,"' 11 would probably be found to lack sufficient definiteness, unless
strictly construed by censor or court. The familiar practice of justifying a denial of license with the mere quotation of a statutory phrase,
thus avoiding the necessity for findings and supporting reasoning,62
will doubtless be more closely restrained.
The misuse of censorship standards permissible in themselves, or
the attempted use of standards not set forth in the statute relied upon,
would almost certainly be struck down by the courts. 63 Movies dealing
with political and social issues have proved especially susceptible to the
,censor's ban on quite diverse, not to say devious, grounds.64 It is
"Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 518 (1948)..
"KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-103 (1949) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 43 (Pur-

don, 1930). In Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of New
York, 280 App. Div. 260, 114 N. Y. S. 2d 561 (3d Dep't 1952), a court split 3-2
upheld a denial of license for exhibiting La Ronde which, it had been found, was
"immoral" and "would tend to corrupt morals." Two dissenting judges contended
that the whole New York statute is unconstitutional, under the Miracle decision.
In these cases, they argued, "the rule should be . . . [that] the determination of
any board or bureau should only be upheld where it is clear that any conclusion
to the contrary would not be entertained by any reasonable mind." Id. at 566.
"VA. CODE ANN. § 2-105 (1950) ; MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 66A, § 6
(1946).
"Kadin, supra note 30, at 555.
*'E.g., Schuman v. Pickert, 277 Mich. 225, 269 N. W. 152 (1936) (Detroit
'ordinance allowed censoring only of movies found "immoral or indecent"; censor
was reversed when he banned film, in reliance on this ordinance, solely because
he considered it "pure Soviet propaganda").
"Gelling v. Texas, 343 U. S. 960 (1952); RD-DR Corp. v. Smith, 89 F.
Supp. 596 (N. D. Ga. 1950), aff'd, 183 F. 2d 562 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U. S.853 (1950) (Lost BomudarieJ banned from Atlanta solely because censor
believed that it might "adversely affect the peace, health, morals and good order
of the City" by encouraging racial strife) ; United Artists Corp. v. Board of
Censors, 189 Tenn. 397, 225 S. W. 2d 550 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S.952
(1950) (Curley banned under Memphis ordinance barring films "inimical to the
public safety, health, -morals, or welfare" because it showed white and Negro
children attending the same school); U. S. v. Motion Picture Film The Spirit
of '76, 252 Fed. 946 (S.D. Cal. 1917) (film consisting of incidents from American
Revolution, including scenes showing extreme cruelties committed by British
troops, suppressed on grounds that it would tend to weaken wartime support for
an ally) ; Hygenic Productions, Inc. v. Keenan, 1 N. J. Super. 461, 62 A. 2d 150
(Ch. 1948) (Mon amid Dad, dealing with parental delinquency and venereal disease, banned for commercial showing, though not considered by censor to be
obscene or indecent); American Committee on Maternal Welfare, Inc. v. Mangan, 257 App. Div. 570, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 39 (3d Dep't 1939), aff'd, 283 N. Y. 551, 27
N. E. 2d -278 (1940) (Birth of a Baby banned from places of amusement as "indecent" and "immoral," though non-commercial showing allowed); Foy Productions, Ltd. v. Graves, 253 App. Div. 475, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 573 (3d Dep't 1938),
aff'd, 278 N. Y. 498, 15 N. E. 2d 435 (1938) (Tomorrow's Children, dealing with
sterilization, banned by New York censor as immoral); Hallmark Productions,
Inc. v. Department of Education, 153 Ohio St. 595, 93 N. E. 2d 13 (1950) (The
Devil's Weed rejected as "harmful");' American Committee to Aid Spanish
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possible, however, that the future banning of films, either before or
after exhibition, on purely political grounds might be required to satisfy the "clear and present danger" test.6 5
There may be a demand that each film be viewed, not as a mere
succession of scenes, but as a whole work, and evaluated according to
its "dominant effect."" Such is the rule applied by customs officials
to books. 61 Yet the very nature of a motion picture film, from which,
unlike a book, a scene or a line may readily be deleted to meet local
demands, may argue against this innovation.
The motion picture industry may see fit to send other test cases
through the courts with the object of reducing censorship legislation
to a nullity by a patient process of judicial pruning. Jurisdictions desiring to continue film censorship may be expected to offset such a
move by legislative amendments making more definite the grounds
68
for censorship available to their censors.
There is the possibility that the whole system of official censorship
will pass to its deserved place in limbo, either by outright repeal or by
judicial construction. Yet even if all censorship legislation were struck
down, there would remain the very substantial restraints placed on
motion picture producers by their own extensive system of self-censorship and taboos ;69 the numerous private, non-industry reviewing agenDemocracy v. Bowsher, 132 Ohio St. 599, 9 N. E. 2d 617 (1937) (Spain in Flames,
a documentary on the Spanish Civil War, banned by censor board on grounds
that "it was harmful in stirring up race hatred and that it was antireligious").
"Note, 60 YALE L. J. 696, 712 (1951). Such a showing would of course
be unnecessary where the words or representations were obscene or libellous in
nature. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250 (1952).
" This suggestion has been made to the courts, only to be rejected. Eureka
Productions, Inc. v. Byrne, 252 App. Div. 355, 300 N. Y. Supp. 218 (3d Dep't
1937).
"'Each word of. the book contributes like a bit of mosaic to the detail of the
the picture which Joyce [the author] is seeking to construct for his readers."
United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. N. Y. 1933),
aff'd, 72 F. 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
" There remain, in any event, the criminal obscenity statutes, which have
always been the chief reliance of most jurisdictions. E. g., N. C. GFN. STAT.
§ 14-193 (1943). There are also available to municipal authorities zoning, fire,
sanitary, and building laws and ordinances which have been employed to effect
an indirect censorship of movie content through the simple expedient of threatening revocation of theater licenses, should a disfavored film be shown. Silverman
v. Gilchrist, 260 Fed. 564 (2d Cir. 1919) ; Bainbridge v. Minneapolis, 131 Miin.
195, 154 N. W. 964 (1915).
" The Motion Picture Association of America (prior to 1945 the Motion
Picture Producers and Distributors of America), was established by the industry
in 1922. The avowed purpose of the organization, popularly known as the
"Hays Office," was to clean up the movies from the inside, a job in which it
has achieved varying degrees of success. The actual work of the M. P. A. is
carried on chiefly by two subsidiary agencies. The Production Code Administration supervises production by member companies from script to finished film.
All advertising material is similarly handled by the Advertising Code Administration. At times criticized as stultifying factors in film production, the M. P. P.
D. A. and M. P. A. appear to have been largely successful in blocking the further
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cies ;'0 and the economic pressures arising from the necessity of maintaining a large and steady "box-office," which means never seriously
offending any significant group or point of view.7 '
Although it is but a first step, the Miracle decision promises to do
much to bring the law of film censorship into phase with the ideal of
substantially complete freedom of expression from all prior restraints,
which has increasingly characterized the law of the United States.
JOHN L. SANDERS.

Costs-Attorney Fees as Costs in Taxpayers' Actions
The recent case of Homer v. Chamber of Commerce' involved a
taxpayer's action to recover, for the benefit of a municipality, public
moneys which had been unlawfully disbursed.2 The court held that
"where, on refusal of municipal authorities to act, a taxpayer successfully prosecutes an action to recover, and does actually recover and
collect, funds of the municipality which had been expended wrongfully or misapplied, the court has implied power in the exercise" of a
sound discretion to make a reasonable allowance from the funds actually
extension of official censorship.

INGLIS, FREEDOM OF THE MovIEs 87-96 et seq.
(1947). The M. P. A. embraces 95% of the producers, distributors, and exhibitors of the nation. Few theaters will rent films lacking the M. P. A. seal of
approval, which is borne by 95% of all films released in the United States. Hughes
Tool Co. v. Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 1006
(S. D. N. Y. 1946).
"0The National Board of Review, pioneer in the field of non-industry film
reviewing, was formed in 1909 with the encouragement of certain producers fearful of threatened government control. Working independently of the film industry, and with non-professional viewers, the Board operates in the public interest under the slogan, "Selection Not Censorship." It does not censor films, but
views and approves those films which in the opinion of the viewers are neither

violative of the obscenity statutes, detrimental to public morality, nor subversive

in effect upon the national audience, when evaluated as a whole. Its operations
are financed by fees charged producers for reviewing films submitted by them.
INGLIS, FREEDom OF THE MoviEs 74-82 (1947) ; 49 YALE L. J. 87, 108-109 (1939).
The National Legion of Decency was formed in 1933 at the instance of the
Catholic Bishops of the United States, and soon secured for itself a position of
great power. Acting as a reviewing agency, the Legion classifies films for the
information of all Catholics, a great many of whom take a periodic pledge to
respect the group's recommendations. In its "C" or "condemned for Catholics"
rating, the Legion holds a weapon the potency of which is much feared by producers. INGLIS, op. cit. supra at 120-125 (1947). See Kazan, Pressure Problem[;] Director Discusses Cuts Compelled in "A Streetcar Named Desire," in
EMERSON AND HABER, EDs., POLITICAL AND CIVrI RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES

722 (1952). There are also several other private organizations which review
films in the interest of their members and the public. See 60 YALE L. J. 696, 714
n. 40 (1951).
1

" ERNST, THE FIRST FREEDOm 202-203 (1946).

1236 N. C. 96, 72 S.E. 2d 21 (1952).
'See Horner v. Chamber of Commerce, 235 N. C. 77, 68 S.E. 2d 660 (1952);
Homer v. Chamber of Commerce, 231 N. C. 440, 57 S.E. 2d 789 (1950) (The
case was before the Supreme Court twice on appeal. The background facts
may be found in these decisions.)
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recovered to be used as compensation for the plaintiff taxpayer's attorney fees."-3
North Carolina has provided by statutory enactments that court
costs in certain types of actions shall include reasonable attorneys'
fees. 4 Outside of those instances covered by statute, the court has been
very restrictive in allowing recovery of such fees as costs,5 the theory
being that counsel fees are matters to be settled between attorney and
client; thereby precluding the courts from being called on to settle
such matters. 6
However, in the principal case the court recognizes the broad doctrine that "while ordinarily attorney fees are taxable as costs only
when expressly authorized by statute, nevertheless, the rule is well
established that a court of equity, or a court in the exercise of equitable
jurisdiction, may in its discretion, and without statutory authorization,
order an allowance for attorney fees to a litigant who at his own expense has maintained a successful suit for the preservation, protection,
or increase of a common fund or of common property, or who has
created at his own ekpense or brought into court a fund which others
may share with him."7 In support of this doctrine the court cites those
North Carolina cases which have allowed recovery of attorney fees
'Horner v. Chamber of Commerce, 236 N. C. 96, 101, 72 S. E. 2d 21, 24

(1952).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21' (1943) provides that costs shall include reasonable
attorneys' fees in the following instances: (1) upon application for year's support for children or widow, (2) caveats to wills, (3) habeas cropus proceedings,
(4) action for divorce or alimony, (5) application for the establishment, alteration or discontinuance of public roads, cartways, or ferries, (6) the compensation of referees and commissioners to take deposition, (7) all costs and expenses incurred in special proceedings under the chapter entitled Partition, (8)
in all proceedings under the chapter entitled Drainage, except as therein otherwise
provided, and (9) in proceedings for the reallotment of Homestead. See A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina1936, 15 N. C. L. R. 333, 334 (1936).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 19-8 (1943) provides that in any action brought to enjoin
certain acts against public morals the court shall tax as part of the costs such
fees for the attorney prosecuting the action as may in the court's discretion be
reasonable remuneration for the services performed by such attorney. N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 40-7 (1943 Recomp. 1950) provides that in Eminent Domain proceedings the court shall appoint some competent attorney to appear for and protect the rights of any party in interest who is unknown or whose residence is
unknown or who has not appeared in the proceedings by an attorney or agent,
and shall make an allowance to the said attorney for his services, which shall
be taxed as costs.
See Trust Co. v. Schneider, 235 N. C. 446, 70 S. E. 2d 578 (1952); In re
Will of M. T. Howell, 204 N. C. 437, 168 S.E. 671 (1933) (now contra by N. C.
GEr.STAT. § 6-21 (1943) ; Ragan v. Ragan, 186 N. C. 461, 119 S.E. 882 (1923) ;
Byrd & Bryan v. Georgia Casualty Co., 184 N. C. 224, 114 S.E. 1 (1922) ; City
of Durham v. Davis, 171 N. C. 305, 88 S.E. 433 (1916); Mordical v. Devereux,
74 N. C. 673 (1876).
Erickson v. Starling, 235 N. C. 643, 71 S. E. 2d 384 (1952); Mordecal v.
Devereux, supra note 5.
'Homer v. Chamber of Commerce, 236 N. C. 96, 97, 72 S. E. 2d 21, 22
(1952).
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incurred by fiduciaries or persons appointed by the courts respecting
litigation involving either the creation or protection of the funds or
property of their trust estates or wards.8 That is, without statutory
authorization, North Carolina has consistently allowed recovery of
counsel fees by administrators, 9 trustees,' next friends of infants,"
and receivers' 2 on the theory that attorney fees incurred in creating or
protecting estates are proper administrative expenses. 13 However,
none of these cases in which such allowances have been deemed proper
deal with a situation whereby a member of a group has maintained an
action for the benefit of himself and other members of the group. Instead, they deal only with situations in which trustees or persons of
similar position have protected or recovered funds or property of their
trust estates in which they have no personal interest or from which
they will derive no personal benefit. It is conceded that a taxpayer
suing on behalf of himself and other taxpayers stands in what might
be recognized as a position of trust, but those North Carolina cases
which have allowed recovery of counsel fees have dealt only with express trusts. Therefore, it appears that North Carolina has given
recognition to a new doctrine which allows counsel fees to a litigant
who, at his own expense, has maintained a successful action to recover
or preserve funds or property in which others may share with him.
A review of decisions from other jurisdictions indicates that this
doctrine has been widely accepted, and counsel fees allowed without
the aid of statutory authority.' 4 In addition to having been applied
to taxpayers' actions similar to the one in the principal case,' 5 it has
been applied to numerous other situations, including action by legatees
' Patrick v. Branch Bank & Trust Co., 216 N. C. 525, 5 S. E. 2d 724 (1939)
(by implication); Hood v. Cheshire, 211 N. C. 103, 189 S. E. 189 (1937) ; In re
Stone, 176 N. C. 336, 97 S. E. 216 (1918) ; Graham v. Carr, 133 N. C.449, 45 S. E.
847 (1903) ; Overman v. Lanier, 157 N. C. 544, 73 S. E. 192 (1911) (by implication) ; Kelly v. Odum, 139 N. C. 278, 51 S. E. 953 (1905) (by implication); Gay
v. Davis, 107 N. C. 269, 12 S. E. 194 (1890). ' Overman v. Lanier, supra note 8 (by implication).
10 Patrick v. Bank & Trust Co., 216 N. C. 525, 5 S. E. 2d 724 (1939)
(by
implication); Hood v. Cheshire, 211 N. C. 103, 189 S. E. 189 (1939) ; Kelly v.
Odum,
139 N. C. 278, 51 S. E. 953 (1905) (by implication).
1 1n re Stone, 176 N. C. 336,
97 S. E. 216 (1918).
12 Graham v. Carr, 133 N. C. 449, 45 S. E. 847 (1903).
Gay v. Davis, 107 N. C. 269, 12 S. E. 194 (1890).
"4See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527 (1881); Buford v. Tobacco
Growers Co-op Ass'n, 42 F. 2d 791 (4th Cir. 1930) ; Marine Cooks' & Stewards'
Ass'n v. Weber, 93 Cal. 2d 327, 208 P. 2d 1009 (1949); Winslow v. Harold G.
Ferguson Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 724, 153 P. 2d 714 (1944) ; In re Linch's Estate, 139
Neb. 761, 298 N. W. 697 (1941) ; Johnson v. Williams, 196 S. C. 528, 14 S. E.
2d 21' (1941). For compilation of cases see Note, 49 A. L. R. 1150 (1927).
15 Russell v. Tate, 52 Ark. 541, 13 S. W. 130 (1890) ; Universal Construction
Co. v. Gore ....
Fla..
51 So. 2d 429 (1951); Tenny v. City of Miami
Beach, 152 Fla. 126, 11 So. 2d 188 (1942) ; Kimble v. Board of Comm'rs of Franklin County, 32 Ind. App. 377, 66 N. E. 1023 (1903) ; Shillito v. City of Spartanburg, 214 S. C. 11, 51 S. E. 2d 95 (1948).
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under a will;1° action by bondholders to preserve a bond fund ;17 action
by beneficiaries of a trust estate to recover funds of the estate ;18 and
action by members of a labor union to restore funds to the benefit of
the union and its members.' 9
Since North Carolina has given recognition to this broad doctrine,
will it follow the lead of other jurisdictions and apply the doctrine to
situations other than taxpayers' actions? The answer is clearly uncertain. The court in the principal case expresses no inclination to
have its decision embrace cases other than taxpayers' actions; however,
this does not affect the real significance of the case. The mere recognition of a doctrine which allows recovery of counsel fees as costs
without statutory authorization indicates a tendency by the court to relax its heretofore strict attitude against such allowances. It is suggested
that this tendency be extended so as to allow recovery of counsel fees
as costs in situations other than taxpayers' actions where substantial
justice requires such allowances; thereby bringing North Carolina into
accord with other jurisdictions.
ERVIN I. BAER.
Covenants--Building Restrictions-Violation of a Restriction
Against the Erection of a Duplex
Defendants owned a lot subject to the following restrictions contained in the deed: "Said property shall be used only for residential
purposes with the understanding that no duplex or apartment house
be erected thereon, and shall not be used for cemetery, hospital, sanitorium, or any business purposes." The house upon the lot, as originally
constructed, was not a duplex and was used as a single-family residence.
Subsequently, defendants installed a second kitchen in a basement playroom, rented out three rooms and bath (the newly created kitchen included) to another family, and occupied the balance of the house as
their own home. Plaintiffs, who owned lots in the same division,
subject to the same restrictions, brought an action to enforce the
restrictions in defendants' deed, alleging that defendants' house, as
converted, constituted a duplex in violation of said covenant. At the
close of plaintiffs' evidence defendants' motion for a nonsuit was granted
by the Superior Court on the ground that the evidence failed to show
the construction of a duplex. Affirming this judgment, the Supreme
Court of Georgia held that the conversion of a playroom into a second
"Johnson v. Williams, 196 S. C. 528, 14 S. E. 2d 21 (1941).
"Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527 (1881).
"IIn re Linch's Estate, 139 Neb. 761, 298 N. W. 697 (1941).
" Marine Cooks' & Stewards' Ass'n v. Weber, 93 Cal. 2d 327, 208 P. 2d 1009
(1949).
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kitchen and renting out rooms, second kitchen included, did not constitute such a structural change as to make the house a duplex in
violation of the restrictive covenant in defendants' deed.,
As a general rule, subject to restrictions contained in his deed, the
owner of land in fee has the right to use the land for any lawful purpose. 2 So fundamental is this right that covenants restricting the use
of the land will be strictly construed by the courts in favor of the free
use of land.3 Where, however, the intent of the parties can be clearly
ascertained with respect to the restrictions imposed, such intent should
govern. 4 In deciding, therefore, whether or not a particular structure
violates a restrictive covenant contained in a deed, the courts attempt
to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the parties by construing the
"restrictive words" according to their accustomed meaning as used and
understood in the community at large. 5
In applying the general rules of construction above, the courts have
generally agreed that where a covenant restricts the structure to be erected to "a residence" or to "residential purposes," without additional
words of restriction or qualification, the covenant is not broken by
the erection of a multi-family house0 or by the conversion of a single'Jordan v. Orr, 71 S. E. 2d 206 (Ga. 1952). In the view of the court, the
controlling question was whether a building restriction prohibiting the erection
of a duplex was violated by the owner renting out rooms to another family. The
court held that it was not.
- Matthews Real Estate Co. v. National Printing and Engraving Co., 330 Mo.
190, 4& S. W. 2d 911 (1932) ; Paff v. Margerum, N. J. Eq. 74, 142 Adt. 6 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1928) ; Schuman v. Schecter, 215 App. Div. 291, 213 N. Y. Supp. 446
(1926); Ivey v. Blythe, 193 N. C. 705, 138 S. E. 2 (1927).
3Wing v. Forest Lawn Cemetery Ass'n, 15 Cal. 2d 472, 101 P. 2d 1099 (1940);
Newton v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 374 Ill. 50, 27 N. E. 2d 821 (1940) ; Glenmore
Distilleries v. Fiorella, 273 Ky. 547, 117 S. W. 2d 173 (1938) ; Whitemarsh v.
Richmond, 179 Md. 523, 20 A. 2d 161 (1941); St. Botolph Club v. Brookline
Trust Co., 292 Mass. 430, 198 N. E. 903 (1936); Wood v. Blancke, 304 Mich.
283, 8 N. W. 2d 67 (1943); Ritzenthaler v. Stehler, 170 Misc. 618, 10 N. Y. S.
2d 898 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Edney v. Powers, 224 N. C. 441, 31 S. E. 2d 372 (1944) ;
Pehlert v. Neff, 152 Pa. Super 84, 31 A. 2d 446 (1943) ; State ex rel. Bollenbeck
v. Village of Shorewood Hills, 237 Wis. 501, 297 N. W. 508 (1941).
'Dooley v. Savannah Bank and Trust Co., 199 Ga. 353, 34 S. E. 2d 522
(1945) ; Broad and Branford Place v. Hochenjos Co., 132 N. J. L. 229, 39 A. 2d
80 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Johnson v. Coulter, 25 App. Div. 697. 297 N. Y. Supp. 345
(1937) ; Starmount Co. v. Greensboro Memorial Park, 233 N. C. 613, 65 S. E. 2d
134 (1951); Davis v. Robinson, 189 N. C. 589, 127 S. E. 697 (1925); Killian
v. Harshaw, 29 N. C. (7 Ired.) 964 (1847).
See note 4 szpra.
Virgin v. Garrett, 233 Ala. 34, 169 So. 711 (1936); Hamm v. Wilson, 169
Ga. 570, 151 S. E. 11 (1930); Yorkway Apartments v. Dundalk Co., 180 Md.
647, 26 A. 2d 398 (1942); Davis v. Sarvari, 250 Mich. 427, 230 N. W. 176
(1930); Miller v. Ettinger, 235 Mich. 527, 209 N. W. 568 (1926); Crane v.
Hathaway, 4 N. J. Misc. 293, 132 Atl. 748 (Ch. 1926); Sweet v. Hollearn, 142
Misc. 408, 254 N. Y. Supp. 625 (Sup. Ct. 1932) ; Pierson v. Rellstab Bros., 246
N. Y. 608, 159 N. E. 671 (1927) ; Bowers v. Fifth Avenue and 77th Street Corp.,
125 Misc. 343, 209 N. Y. Supp. 743 (Sup. Ct. 1925) ; De Laney v. Van Ness, 193
N. C. 721, 138 S. E. 28 (1927) ; Satterwaite v. Gibbs, 288 Pa. 428, 156 Atl. 862
(1927) ; Jernigan v. Capps, 187 Va. 73, 45 S. E. 2d 886 (1947).
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house.7

family house into a multi-family
On the other hand, where
the covenant restricts the structure to be erected to "one residence," "a
private dwelling," "a single dwelling" or other restrictions of similar
import, without additional words of qualification, the courts have
generally held that the erection of even a two-family house8 or the conversion of a single-family house into a two-family house9 constitutes a
violation of the covenent. In each of these cases, the court construed
the restrictive words and rendered its decision with a view to effectuating the intent of the parties. Thus, restrictions to "a residence"
or "residential purposes" were construed as the manifestation of an
intention to preserve only a general residential atmosphere. Those
restrictions to "single" or "private" residences and dwellings were
construed, however, as the indicia of an intention not only to preserve
a general residential atmosphere but also to restrict the style of the
house to that of a "single-family." Consequently, it follows that a
multi-family house would not violate the restrictive covenants in the
former instance, but would do so in the latter.
Where, as in the principal case, a covenant not only restricts the
land to "residential purposes" but goes further to prohibit the erection
of a "duplex" and "use" of the property for enumerated purposes, the
courts disagree as to what constitutes a "duplex" in violation of the
covenant. 10 This disagreement seems to stem from the divergent
definitions of a "duplex house" formulated by the courts in their effort to effectuate the intent of the parties."' That is to say, whether
'Leverich v. Roy, 338 Il1. App. 248, 87 N. E. 2d 226 (1947) ; Ulmer v. Ulrey,
280 Ky. 457, 133 S. W. 2d 744 (1940); Bennett v. Petrino, 235 N. Y. 474, 139
N. E. 578 (1923) ; Austin v. Richardson, .. Tex ..... 288 S. W. 180 (1926).
Michigan Shores Estates v. Robbins, 290 Mich. 384, 287 N. W. 547 (1939)
(one residence only) ; Nerrerter v. Little, 258 Mich., 462, 243 N. W. 25 (1932)
(dwelling house only); Seeley v. Phi Sigma Delta Corp., 245 Mich. 252, 222
N. W. 180 (1928) (private dwelling only); Bailey v. Jackson-Campbell Co.,
191 N. C. 61, 131 S. E. 567 (1926) (not more than one house) ; Lebo v. Fitton,
71 Ohio App. 192, 41 N. E. 2d 402 (1942) (single dwelling only).
'Hooker v. Alexander, 129 Conn. 433, 29 A. 2d 308 (1943) (one family house
only) ; Allen v. Barrett, 213 Mass. 36, 99 N. E. 575 (1912) (a single-family
house) ; Paine v. Bergrose, 119 Misc. 796, 198 N. Y. Supp. 311 (Sup. Ct. 1922)
(private dwelling only); Upper Arlington Co. v. Lawwell, 20 Ohio App. 362,
152 N. E. 203 (1915) (single private dwelling only); Gerstell v. Knight, 245
Pa. 83, 26 A. 2d 329 (1942) (one resident only).
'See note 16 infra.
11 Baker v. Lunde, 96 Conn. 530, 114 Atl. 673 (1921)
(a double house having
one continuous roof) ; Donnelly v. Spitza, 246 Mich. 284, 222 N. W. 396 (1929)
(a house designed for two families); Kenwood Land Co. v. Hancock Investment Co., 169 Mo. App. 715, 155 S. W. 861 (1913) (a double house or a house
in duplicate) ; Hammett v. Born, 247 Pa. 148, 93 Atl. 505 (1915) (a house designed for occupancy of two families under one roof); Schwarser v. Calcasian
Lumber Co., 176 S. W. 2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) (a building designed for
two families, divided vertically down the middle). See also Edwards v. City
of Los Angeles, 48 Cal. App. 2d 62, 119 P. 2d 370 (1941) (dicta to effect that
a duplex may'in fact be apartments or flats).

19521

195]NOTES AND COMMENTS

the court will decide that a particular structure is a "duplex" in violation of a covenant prohibiting its erection will depend not upon universal definitive terminology but rather upon the term "duplex" as
used and understood in the community at large.' 2
Thus, if the building is designed, both exteriorly and interiorly, as
two houses under one roof, each complete in itself, with a partition
between and separate entrances, the courts have held it to be a duplex
in violation of a covenant restricting the land to "residential purposes"
and prohibiting the erection of a "duplex."'- The reason being that
the parties intended to preserve a residential atmosphere and to restrict the style of structure to that of a single-family house. Where,
however, the building erected, as in the principal case, has the conventional exterior design of a "single-family house" but is being used
interiorly as a "double-family house," there is sharp conflict among the
courts as to whether it violates the covenant prohibiting the erection of
a "duplex."' 4
The strict construction, followed by the court in the principal case,
is that where a portion of the covenant restricts the type of structure
to be erected, its use is not to be considered to be restricted where elsewhere in the covenant are enumerated specific uses which are not permitted, and the use complained of is not one of those excluded.' 5 Accordingly, if the structure is being used as a residence, although by two
families with separate living accommodations, and is exteriorly designed
as a single-family residence, the courts following this view refuse to
hold it to be a "duplex" in violation of the covenant. 6 The other and
more liberal construction, is that the building restriction to "a residence"
and "no duplex" defines the use to which the building may be put as
well as its exterior form notwithstanding the fact that such use is not
one of those elsewhere prohibited in the covenant. 7 The courts following this view have held houses with a "single-family residence"
exterior design but being used interiorly as a "two-family residence"
to be a duplex in violation of the covenant.' 8
'

13

See note 11 supra.

Hooker v. Alexander, 129 Conn. 433, 29 A. 2d 308 (1943) ; Upper Arlington

Company v. Lawwell, 20 Ohio App. 362, 152 N. E. 203 (1915); Ward v. Prospect Manor Corp., 188 Wis. 534, 206 N. W. 856 (1926).
"' Jordan v. Orr, 71 S. E. 2d 206 (Ga. 1952); Renn v. Whitehurst, 181 Va.
360, 25 S.E. 2d 276 (1945). See also cases cited in notes 15-17 inira.
"Clark v. James, 87 Hun 215, 33 N. Y. Supp. 1020 (Sup. Ct. 1895). See
note, 155 A. L. R. 1012 (1945).
" Leverich v. Roy, 338 Ill. App. 248, 87 N. E. 2d 226 (1947); Ulmer v.
Ulrey, 280 Ky. 457, 133 S. W. 2d 744 (1940); Bennett v. Petrino, 235 N. Y.
474, 139 N. E. 578 (1923); Austin v. Richardson, ... Tex. ... , 288 S. W. 180

(1926).

17 Michigan Shores Estates v. Robbins, 290 Mich. 384, 287 N. W. 547 (1939);
Straus v. Ginsberg, 218 Minn. 57, 15 N. W. 2d 130 (1944) ; Ritzenthaler v. Stehler, 170 Misc. 618, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 89& (Sup. Ct. 1939); Pulitzer v. Campbell,
147 Misc. 700, 262 N. Y. Supp. 743 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
" See note 17 supra.
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While North Carolina has followed the general rules that a restriction to "residential purposes only" is not violated by the erection
of or conversion into a multi-family house,"0 but that such an erection
or conversion does violate a restriction to a "private dwelling" or
"single-family house," 20 our court has not decided the question involved
in the principal case. 2 ' Past decisions indicate, however, that the decision, if and when rendered, would be substantially in accord with that
in the instant case.2 2 In view of the fact that the modern tendency is
not to imply restrictions which might or ought to have been written
in by the parties, it is submitted that the view taken in the principal
23
case, although the stricter, is nevertheless the sounder view.
JOSEPH P. HENNESSEE.
Damages-Mental Anguish-Action Arising Out of Tort
Recently, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld a lower court
decision that damages could be recovered for mental anguish resulting
from the unauthorized removal of flowers from the grave of a deceased
spouse. The court, in rendering its decision, held that the plaintiff
could recover damages for the mental anguish endured by him as a
result of the trespass to his burial lot regardless of whether or not he
suffered physical injury. 1
" De Laney v. Van Ness, 193 N. C. 721, 138 S. E. 28 (1927).
20

'

East Side Builders v. Brown, 234 N. C. 517, 67 S. E. 2d 489 (1951).

This question appeared, however, in East Side Builders v. Brown, 234
N. C. 517, 67 S. E. 2d 489 (1951), where the restriction was to "single-family
residences." It was not answered, however, the case being reversed on other
grounds. It has not been retried, pending the decision in Huffman v. Johnson,
236 N. C. 225 (1952). This latter case has recently been decided in favor of
the free use of the land. It adds little to the law, and is distinguishable from
the principal case and from East Side Builders v. Brown, supra, in that there
was no allegation or proof of the installation of a second kitchen and the formation of a separate apartment, or that a separate apartment was in fact rented.
22 The North Carolina view is that the covenant must be strictly construed,
Starmont Co. v. Greensboro Memorial Park, 233 N. C. 613, 65 S. E. 2d 134
(1951), in favor of the free use of the land, Davis v. Robinson, 189 N. C. 589,
127 S. E. 697 (1925); and that restrictions should be created in plain and explicit terms, Ivey v. Blythe, 193 N. C. 705, 138 S. E. 2 (1927). A restriction to
"residence" or "residential purposes" will not prohibit the erection of a multifamily house, De Laney v. Van Ness, 193 N. C. 721, 138 S. E. 28 (1927). A
residence occupied by four families is no less a residential building. That it is
intended to accommodate more than one family does not ipso facto bring it within
what is forbidden. Charlotte Consol. Construction Co. v. Cobb, 195 N. C. 690,
143 S. E. 522 (1928).
But see Bailey v. Jackson-Campbell Co., 191 N. C. 61,
131 S. E. 567 (1926) where the court held that an apartment house is not a
"residence" within a covenant providing that "not more than one residence shall
be built."
" It is suggested that if the intent of the parties is to restrict the property to

single-family use only, the covenant should read: "Said property is restricted
to the erection and maintenance of a single-family type residence, with the understanding said residence shall not be used by more than a single family." This
or similarly worded restrictions leave no doubt as to the intent of the parties.
" Matthews v. Forrest, 235 N. C. 281. 69 S. E. 2d 553 (1952).
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Actions to recover damages for mental anguish are based upon one
of two causes of actions-ex contractu or ex delicto.2 The general
rule in the breach of contract cases is that no recovery will be allowed
for mental anguish arising out of a breach of contract. The courts have
established certain exceptions to this general rule most important of
which are: the breach of marriage contract cases.3 decisions involving
indignities to passengers of common carriers,4 and guests of modem
day innkeepers;5 and the "telegraph cases,"" where substantial recoveries for mental disturbance caused by the company's failure or negli7
gent telay in delivery of intrastate messages.
North Carolina and a few other jurisdictions have added another
recent exception to the contract rule in the burial cases where plaintiffs are allowed to recover for mental anguish alone arising out of a
breach of a burial contract by a defendant undertaker.8 The limitation placed on such recoveries is that the parties must have reasonably
anticipated that mental anguish would follow the breach.
The tort cases involving recovery of damages for mental anguish
may be divided into actions arising out of intentional torts and those
The North Carolina court made no distinction between the two types of

actions prior to the decision of Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N. C. 10, 55 S.E. 2d
810 (1949). Here they discarded the ex delicto cause and based their decision
on the ex contractu,cause of action. See 28 N. C. LAw REV. 318 (1950).
'Thrush v. Fulihart, 230 Fed. 24 (4th Cir. 1915) ; Benson v. Williams, 239
Iowa 742, 32 N. W. 2d 813 (1948) ; see McCoRmicx, DAMAGES
145 (1935) ; 25
C. J. S. Damages § 64 (1941).
'Rydberg v. Mitchell, 87 F. Supp. 640 (1949) ; Southeastern Greyhound Corp.
v. Graham, 69 Ga. App. 621, 26 S. E. 2d 371 (1943); Hardwick v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 306 Ky. 579, 208 S. W. 2d 733 (1948); Braswell v.
Stokes, 191 S. C. 482, 53 S. E. 2d 173 (1939); cf Gulf Mobile and Northern
R. R. Co. v. Thornberry, 185 Miss. 576, 188 So. 545 (1939).
' Milner Hotels, Inc. v. Brent, 207 Miss. 892, 43 So. 2d 654 (1949) ; Milner
Hotels, Inc. v. Dougherty, 195 Miss. 718, 15 So. 2d 358 (1943); Kirstein v.
Hotel Taft Corp., 183 Misc. 713, 51 N. Y. S. 2d 162 (Sup. Ct. 1944) aff'd 269
App. Div. 683, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 376 (1945) (held no cause of action set out for
husband as he was not a guest of hotel); Boyce v. Greely Square Hotel Co.,
181 App. Div. 61, 168 N. Y. S. 191 (1917) aff'd 228 N. Y. 106, 126 N. E. 647
(1920) (recovery allowed for mental anguish where husband had permission to
visit room in which wife was registered and house detective demanded entrance
at night while husband was present with wife and said, "You are using this
place for a whore house").
Usually the messages involved relate news of serious illness or death of
relatives although recoveries have been allowed in other situations. Russ v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 222 N. C. 504, 23 S. E. 2d 681 (1943) ; Green v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 136 N. C. 489, 49 S. E. 165 (1904) (decision
cites holdings of states where recoveries are allowed for mental anguish and
those where such recoveries are denied). See 79 C. J. S. Telegraphs and Telephones §§ 236, 245, 251 (1941).
' Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Speight, 254 U. S. 17, reversing 178 N. C.
146, 100 S. E. 351 (1919) (federal rule applies if message is sent across state
lines and no action may be maintained on a claim for mental anguish even in
the state where such damages are allowed).
8
Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 196 P. 2d 915 (1948) ; Lamm v. Shingleton,
231 N. C. 10, 55 S. E. 2d 810 (1949). Cf Dunahoo v. Bess, 146 Fla. 182, 200
So. 541 (1941).
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The common law and majority, view

today is that there can be no recovery for mental anguish .unless it
can be brought into the scope of some recognized tort.9 Mental anguish,
as an element of damages, has been liberally allowed from the beginning in actions for intentional torts such as assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and seduction.1" The general rule
in the negligence cases is that damages for mental anguish are never
allowed unless there is resulting physical injury." A line of modern
cases, however, has held defendants responsible for the intentional infliction of serious emotional distress even though no independent cause of
action is stated and no physical injury accompanied the mental suffering alleged to have been experienced.' 2 It must be pointed out that
included as intentional acts are those acts which the defendant knows
or should know will result in mental anguish to the plaintiff.
In deciding the instant case, the court seems to be following the
old rule of finding an independent cause of action (the trespass to the
burial lot) upon which to rest the mental anguish damages. Similarly,
in the contract case of Lamm v. Shingleton,'3 the foundation of the
action was the technical breach of contract. In both of these cases, it
is evident that the plaintiffs are not interested in the nominal damages
due them for the trespass or for the technical breach but are looking for
the substantial damages caused by their mental suffering.
As far back as 1891, a Minnesota court refuted the technical cause
of action theory and stated that the substantial wrong was the indignity
to the dead and not the technical trespass or breach of contract. 14
'Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N. W. 238 (1891); Bouillon v. Laclede
Gaslight Co., 148 Mo. App. 462, 463, 129 S. W. 401, 402 (1910): "The doctrine
is that though a mere mental distrubance of itself may not be a cause of action
in the first instance, fright and mental anguish are competent elements of damage

if they arise out of a trespass upon the plaintiff's person or possession
1.
" Gadsden General Hosp. v. Hamilton, 212 Ala. 531, 103 So. 553 (1925)
(false imprisonment); McVay v. Carpe, 29 N. W. 2d 582 (Iowa 1947) (false
imprisonment) ; Anthony v. Norton, 60 Kan. 341, 56 Pac. 529 (1899) (seduction) ;
Price v. Minnesota, D. & W. R. R., 130 Minn. 229, 153 N. W. 532 (1915)
(malicious prosecution) ; Trogden v. Terry, 172 N. C. 540, 90 S.E. 583 (1916)
(assault) ; Geissler v. Geissler, 96 Wash. 150, 164 Pac. 746 (1917) (battery).
1'Erwin v. Milligan, 188 Ark. 658, 67 S. W. 2d 592 (1934); Kirksey v,
Jerrigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950); Dunahoo v. Bess, 146 Fla. 182, 200 So.
541 (1941); Manger v. Gordon, 22 Ohio Ops. 436, 70 Ohio Supp. 98 (1941).
' Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 70 (App. D. C.) 183, 105 F. 2d 62
(1939); Herman Saks & Sons v. Ivey, 26 Ala. App. 240, 157 So. 265 (1934);
State Rubbish Collectors Assn. v. Siliznoff, 240 P. 2d 282 (Cal. 1952) ; Bowden
v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 313, 216 P. 2d 571 (1950) ; Emden v. Vitz, 88
Cal. App. 2d 313, 198 P. 2d 696 (1948) ; LaSalle Extension University v. Fogerty,
126 Neb. 451, 253 N. W. 424 (1934) ; Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N. C.
808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936). See RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 46 (1948 Supp.).
13231 N. C. 10, 55 S. E. 2d 810 (1949).
X'In Larsen v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 311, 50 N. W. 238, 239 (1891) in
rendering its decision the court stated,

"

. . . it would be a reproach to the

law if the plaintiff's right to recover for mental anguish . . . should be made
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Wording of the decision in Matthews v. Forrest15 indicates that the
court felt that redress should be granted for mental suffering which is
certain to follow from the desecration of a grave in plaintiff's burial
lot.16 Thus, with the law remaining as it is today, a daughter would
be unable to recover damages actually endured for mental anguish arising out of an indignity to the deceased mother, because her brother, and
not she, owned the plot in which the mother was interred.
To overcome inequities such as this, iA is submitted that courts
forget the requirement of a technical tort and recognize mental anguish
as a separate and independent cause of action, where it is serious and
intentionally inflicted.
DEANE F. BELL.
Eminent Domain-Violation of Restrictive Covenants
Necessity of Compensation
In the recent case of City of Raleigh v. Edwards' the city instituted
special proceedings to condemn certain lots for the erection of a water
storage tank. Intervening as omitted claimants, the owners of adjacent
lots sought compensation on the ground that the contemplated use by
the city was in violation of covenants restricting the use of the property
in that area to private dwelling purposes only. Considering this problem for the first time, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
such building restrictions created a vested interest in land in the nature
of a negative easement on each lot for the benefit of, and appurtenant
to, each other lot in the restricted area.2 The court allowed compensato depend upon whether in committing the act the defendant also committed
a technical trespass upon the plaintiff's premises, while everybody's common
sense would tell him that the real and substantial wrong was not the trespass
on the land, but the indignity to the dead."
110 235 N. C. 281, 69 S. E. 2d 553 (1952).
' Id.at 285, 69 S. E. 2d at 557. "The law must heed the realities of life if
it is to fulfill its function. As Justice Barnhill so well said in his able opinion in
Lantin v. Shingleton, 231 N. C. 10, 55 S.E. 2d 810, 'the tenderest feelings of the
human heart center around the remains of the dead.' In recognition of this
reality we hold compensatory damages may be awarded to a plaintiff for mental
suffering actually endured by him as the natural and probable consequence of a
trespass to his burial lot, even though his mental suffering may not be accompanied by physical injury."
235 N. C. 671, 71 S. E. 396 (1952).
North Carolina has generally adhered to the principle that equitable easements are a property right. Vernon v. Realty Co., 226 N. C. 58, 36 S.E. 2d
710 (1946) (A restrictive covenant is contractual in nature and creates incorporeal property right); Turner v. Glenn, 222 N. C. 620, 18 S. E. 2d 197 (1942)
(Restrictive covenant creates an interest in land which is within the Statute
of Frauds); Pepper v. West End Development Co., 211 N. C. 166, 189 S. E.
628 (1937); Moore v. Shore, 208 N. C. 446, 181 S. E. 275 (1935); Moore
v. Shore, 206 N. C. 699, 175 S. E. 117 (1934); Davis v. Robinson, 189 N. C.
589, 27 S. E. 697 (1925) (Building restriction creates negative easement which
being an interest in land comes within the Statute of Frauds). But see St.
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tion declaring that in a constitutional sense the proposed use of the
property amounted to a taking of that property right.3
The underlying basis for the enforcement of equitable easements,
or interests arising out of promises regarding the use of the land, is
the doctrine of equitable notice as set forth in Tulk v. Moxhay.4 Since
these interests originate in promises there has been considerable controversy as to whether they should be treated as mere contractual rights
or as interests in the land itself.5 In eminent domain situations where
a public agency takes restricted property for a purpose inconsistent
with restrictive covenants the question concerning the technical nature
of the interests in the parties is usually of primary importance in deciding whether compensation should be allowed.
Most of the states in which the condemnation problem has arisen
have seen in these interests sufficient property elements to classify them
as rights in land.0 In these cases, once it is concluded that the proposed
Peter's Church v. Bragaw, 144 N. C. 126, 56 S. E. 688 (1907) where the language
used seems to indicate that the court thought a building restriction created a
contract right to be enforced in equity.
' "No person ought to be . . . disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges
. . . or in any manner deprived of life, liberty or property, but by the law of
the land." N. C. CoNsT. Art. I, § 17; " . . . nor shall private property be taken
for public use without just compensation." U. S. CoNsT. AAMEND. V.
'2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848). In this case was set forth the
principle that a contract of a landowner in which he agrees to abstain from using
his land in a particular manner will be enforceable in equity against purchasers
and possessors with notice even though the agreement did not create a covenant
running with the land. Accord, Bryant v. Grosse, 155 Cal. 132, 99 Pac. 449
(1909) ; Bauby v. Krasnow, 107 Conn. 109, 139 Atl. 508 (1927) ; Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 Atl. 330 (1938); Evans v. Foss, 194 Mass. 513, 80
N. E. 587 (1907); Parker v. Nightingale, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 341 (1863);
Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440 (1877); 3 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 858 (3d Ed. 1939).
'A detailed discussion of the theories as to the technical nature of equitable
servitudes is beyond the scope of this note. A minority of courts and writers
support the theory that such rights are only contractual rights to be enforced
by specific performance. Bauby v. Krasnow, 107 Conn. 109, 139 Atl. 508 (1927) ;
Weigman v. Kusel, 270 Ill. 520, 110 N. E. 884 (1915); Cotton v. Creese, 80
N. J. Eq. 540, 85 Atl. 600 (Ch. 1912); DeGray v. Monmouth Beach Club House
Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 329, 24 AtI. 388 (Ch. 1892) ; CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS
RuNNiNG WITH LAND 171-174 (2d Ed. 1947); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 861
(3d Ed. 1939); Ames, Specific Performance For and Against Strangers to the
Contract, 17 HARv. L. REV. 174 (1904); Giddings, Restrictions Upotn the Uses
of Land, 5 HARV. L. REv. 274 (1892); Stone, Equitable Rights and Liabilities of
Strangers to a Contract, 18 COL. L. REv. 291 (1918). The majority view is that
restrictive covenants create a property right. Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556,
147 So. 862 (1933) ; Bristol v. Woodward, 251 N.'Y. 275, 167 N. E. 441 (1929) ;
Goldberg v. Nicola, 319 Pa. 183, 178 Atl. 809 (1935) ; Queen City Park Ass'n
v. Gale, 110 Vt. 110, 3 A. 2d 529 (1938); Clark, op. cit. supra 174-177; 3 TxrFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 861; Jones, Equitable Restrictions on the Use of Real
Property, 13 CBI-KNT. Ray. 33 (1934); Pound, The Progress of Law, 33
HARmv. L. REv. 813 (1920); 31 HARv. L. REv. 876 (1918); 28 HARv. L. REy. 201
(1914).
'Town of Stanford v. Vuono, 108 Conn. 359, 143 At. 245 (1928) (Adjacent
owners within restricted residential area allowed compensation for building
of school by city on ground that restriction created interest in land in nature
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use is in violation of the restriction, payment is allowed as if the in7
terests were legal easements.
Other courts fail to recognize any property rights arising from restrictive covenants and insist that the rights are only contractual in
nature.8 Under this view the condemnation clauses of the constitutions are avoided and no payment is allowed.9
The importance of the technical approach as a basis for decision is
weakened by the fact that most of the courts which have denied compensation have done so on grounds that do not necessitate a definite stand
of easement); Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Chadwick, 228 Mass. 242, 117
N. E. 244 (1917) (Equitable restriction held to be property right in favor of
whose estate it runs); Ladd v. City of Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 24 N. E. 858
(1890) (City required to pay compensation for building courthouse destroying
an easement in favor of light and air created by restrictive covenant) ; Sipes v.
McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N. W. 2d 638 (1947) (Restriction limiting use and
occupation of property to the Caucasian race held to create valuable property
right for which compensation must be paid) ; Johnstone v. Detroit, G. H. & M.
Ry., 245 Mich. 65, 222 N. W. 325 (1928) (Owners of property in restricted subdivision held qualified for compensation on the taking of part of the area for
a railroad track) ; Allen v. Detroit, 169 Mich. 464, 133 N. W. 317 (1910) (Erection of firehouse in area restricted to private dwellings entitled adjoining owners
to compensation for taking of private property); Allen v. Murfin, 159 Mich.
612, 124 N. W. 581 (1910); Porter v. Johnson, 232 Mo. App. 1150, 115 S. W.
2d 529 (1938) (Restriction against Negroes creates easement in favor of owner
of one parcel of land and to all the parcels covered by the restrictions, can
be taken by public agency only after payment of just compensation) ; State v.
Mulloy, 332 Mo. 1107, 61 S. W. 2d 741 (1933) ; Britton v. School District, 328
Mo. 1185, 44 S. W. 2d 33 (1931) (School District not allowed to erect new
school until compensation paid to adjoining landowners for violation of restrictions that certain property be used as a private street) ; Peters v. Buckner, 288
Mo. 618, 232 S. W. 1024 (1921) (Rights conferred by building restrictions were
property rights which must be paid for when destroyed by public taking) ; Hayes
v. Waverly & P. Ry., 51 N. J. Eq. 345, 27 Atl. 648 (Ch. 1893) (Restrictions prohibiting certain uses of property of railroad company held to create a right of
amenity in the land in the nature of an easement) ; Flynn v. New York, W. & B.
Ry., 218 N. Y. 140, 112 N. E. 913 (1916) (Restrictive covenants create compensable damages which otherwise would have been noncompensable).
T
In Herr v. Board of Education, 82 N. J. L. 610, 83 At. 173 (1912) the
court, in theory, allowed compensation for the taking of restricted land but held
that the total amount recoverable by all the parties, including the owner of the
fee and the holders of the restrictions, would be the value of the land taken
without regard to restrictions. It was the problem of the property owners to
establish their respective rights among themselves. See Note, 36 W. VA. L. Q.
363, 365 (1930).
'Sackett v. Los Angeles City School, 118 Cal. App. 254, 5 P. 2d 23 (1931);
Anderson v. Lynch, 188 Ga. 154, 3 S. E. 2d 85 (1939); City of Houston v.
Wynne, 279 S. W. 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925), affd, 115 Tex. 255, 281 S. W.
544 (1926). See Moses v. Hazen, 69 F. 2d 842, 844 (D. C. Cir. 1934); Wharton v. United States, 153 Fed. 876, 878 (1st Cir. 1907) ; Friesen v. City of Glendale, 79 Cal. 498, 288 Pac. 1080, 1082 (1930).
* It has been suggested that under the more modem constitutions which provide compensation for land that is taken or davmaged by the state that there will
be damage to the benefited land by interference with a restrictive covenant even
though there is no interest in the land taken. 14 WAsH L. Ray. 137, n. 1 (1939).
However, compensation was denied in Georgia under such a provision without
considering the "or damaged" clause. Anderson v. Lynch, 188 Ga. 154, 3 S. E.
2d 85 (1939) ; Comment, 38 MIcH L. REv. 357, 358 n. 6 (1940).
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on the issue of property rights.
One theory advanced declares that
the covenants must be construed as not intending to prohibit any acts
of public agencies; that if such intention had been expressed the
covenants would be void as against public policy."1 In other cases the
courts decide that the restrictive language does not bar the contemplated
use, often resorting to rather violent construction to reach this con12
clusion.
The possibility of a reconciliation of the two conflicting theories
concerning the nature of the rights arising from the "doctrine of Tulk
v. Moxhay"13 seems unlikely. It is doubtful whether this is essential
"United States v. Certain Lands, 112 Fed. 622 (C. C. R. 1. 1899) has been
relied upon by practically every court denying compensation for the public taking of restricted land as the landmark decision supporting the contract doctrine
of equitable easements in an eminent domain situation. It is submitted that since
the court's decision was actually based on the fact that the restriction was never
violated by the government's use of the land that the contract doctrine expressed
was pure dictum. In a much more recent case involving the exercise of eminent
domain by the Federal Government the court said: "Whether the Federal Government, as distinguished perhaps from the State of New York, can brush aside
the restrictive covenants concerning the character of buildings to be erected upon
the condemned property, without making compensation to the remaining lot
owners, is too serious an issue to be disposed of upon a mere motion to intervene." United States v. Certain Lands, 49 F. Supp. 265, 267 (E. D. N. Y.
1943). No mention was made of the earlier decision denying compensation in a
similar situation, but the court did cite Peters v. Buckner, 288 Mo. 618, 232
S. W. 1024 (1921) which allowed compensation on the ground that restrictive
covenants created a property right.
1 In Doan v. Cleveland Short Line Ry., 92 Ohio St. 461, 112 N. E. 505, 506
(1915) the court, in denying compensation for the violation of restrictive covenants by a railroad company, argued, "If, on the other hand, it (restrictive covenant) be construed as prohibiting the use of the property for any purpose other
than that of residences, it would prevent a public use of the lots and thereby
defeat the right of eminent domain. The right of eminent domain rests upon
public necessity, and a contract or covenant or plan of allotment which attempts
to prevent the exercise of that right is clearly against public policy, and is therefore illegal and void." The same view is advanced in Norfolk and W. Ry. v.
Gale, 12 Ohio St. 110, 162 N. E. 385 (1928) ; Ward v. Cleveland Short Line Ry.,
92 Ohio St. 571, 112 N. E. 507 (1915) ; and as an additional or alternative ground
in Sackett v. Los Angeles City School, 118 Cal. App. 254, 5 P. 2d 23 (1931);
Anderson v. Lynch, 188 Ga. 154, 3 S. E. 2d 85 (1939); City of Houston v.
Wynne, 278 S. W. 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). See United States v. Certain
Lands, 112 Fed. 622, 628 (C. C. R. I. 1899).
" A restriction which provided that "all buildings erected or to be erected
. . . shall be built and used for residential purposes only" and not be used for
"any trade, business, manufacturing or mercantile purpose!' was held not to
intend the exclusion of a public school. Moses v. Hazen, 69 F. 2d 842 (D. C.
Cir. 1934). Restriction that land be used for residential purposes only construed
not to forbid the building of a public street through the area. Friesen v. City
of Glendale, 79 Cal. 498, 288 Pac. 1080 (1930); criticized in 19 CAL. L. RFy. 58
(1931). Provision that "no slaughter house, smith shop, steam engine, furnace,
forge, boneboiling establishment . . . drinking saloon . . . shall ever be located
upon any part of said granted land, and that no other noxious, dangerous, or
offensive trade or business whatever shall ever be done" held not to prevent
the erection of coastal defense fortifications by tfie government upon the property.
United States v. Certain Lands, 112 Fed. 622 (C. C. R. I. 1899), aff'd sub num.
Wharton v. United States, 153 Fed. 876 (1st Cir. 1907).
" See note 4 supra.
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when' many of the courts have not relied on either theory for 'their
decisions, 14 and others have tended to advance one or the other concepts as a means to secure desired social results. 15 The presence of
a conflicting theory has seemingly justified the refusal of the latter
courts to apply the logical extension of the theory applied in earlier
cases to new fact situations where the result might be undesirable. With
this attitude prevailing the problem appears to be one of policy rather
than legal technicalities.
When viewed in the light of the well-established compensable interests under the laws of eminent domain there is no logical reason
why public policy should discriminate against rights arising out of
restrictive covenants. It is evident that landowners, through the use
of such covenants, cannot prohibit the public exercise of eminent domain. 16 The only effect would be to increase the financial and procedural burden of the condemnor. 17 Yet, if landowners may increase
that burden by the creation of legal easements or by adding physical
improvements to their land, it would seem absurd to argue that it is
against public policy to reach the same result by restrictive covenants.' s
",Moses v. Hazen, 69 F. 2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1934) ; United States v. Certain
Lands, 112 Fed. 622 (C.C. R. I. 1899), aff'd sab nora. Wharton v. United States,
153 Fed. 876 (1st Cir. 1907) ; Friesen v. City of Glendale, 79 Cal. 498, 288 Pac.
1080 (1930) ; Norfolk and W. Ry. v. Gale, 19 Ohio St. 110, 162 N. E. 385 (1928) ;
Doan v. Cleveland Short Line Ry., 92 Ohio St. 461, 112 N. E. 505 (1915); Ward
v. Cleveland Short Line Ry., 92 Ohio St. 571, 112 N. E. 507 (1915).
" In practically no jurisdiction have the courts relied consistently on one
established theory. Many of them have treated building restrictions as creating

a property right when the question envolves the Statute of Frauds, but seem to
find only a contract right in eminent domain situations. Compare Martin v.
Holme, 197 Cal. 733, 242 Pac. 718 (1925), with Friesen v. City of Glendale, 79
Cal. 498, 288 Pac. 1080 (1930) ; Miller v. Babb, 263 S. W. 253 (Tex. Comm.App.
1924), with City of Houston v. Wynne, 279 S. W. 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925);
Swan v. Mitshikun, 207 Mich. 70, 173 N. W. 529 (1919), with WindemereGrand Improvement Ass'n v. American Bank, 205 Mich 539, 172 N. W. 29 (1919).
" United States v. Land in Pendleton County, 11 F. Supp. 311 (N. D. W. Va.
1935). Some courts speak of such restrictions as defeating the right of eminent
domain if construed as intending to effect public agencies. United States v.
Certain Lands, 112 Fed. 622 (C. C. R. I. 1899) ; Doan v. Cleveland Short Line
Ry., 92 Ohio St. 461, 112 N. E. 505 (1915) ; Ward v. Cleveland Short Line Ry.,
92 Ohio St. 471, 112 N. E. 507 (1915). The fallacy of this argument lies in
the assumption of its minor premise that the requirement that the state compensate the owner of the neighboring property for the taking of his interest in
the condemned property actually prevents the exercise of any governmental
function. Town of Stanford v. Vuono, 108 Conn. 359, 143 Atl. 245 (1928);
Peters v. Buckner, 288 Mo. 618, 232 S. W. 1024 (1921).
17 Two courts denying compensation appeared to have been greatly influenced
by the possibilities of multitudinous claims against the condemning body. Anderson v. Lynch, 188 Ga. 154, 3 S. E. 2d 85 (1939); City of Houston v. Wynne,
279 S. W. 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). As a practical matter only a relatively
few owners nearby the condemned land would receive more than nominal danages for most governmental interferences. See the discussion of this point in
Aigler, Measure of Compensation"for Extinguishment of Easements by Condemnation (1945) Wis. L. REv. 5, 32.
"s"Nor is there anything in our laws, system of government, or spirit of our
institutions whiich curtails the genius of a citizen in creating or enhancing values
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By giving these restrictions the dignity of an interest in land North
Carolina has not only adhered to its established attitude toward equitable easements,19 but has emerged with what would seem to be the
most reasonable and logical view in regard to policy.
THoMAs W. STEED, JR.

Libel-Liability for Negligent Republication
In the recent case of Hellar v. Bianco,' a writing on the restroom
wall of a tavern resulted in a suit against the owners for republication
2
of a libel. The writing, which challenged the chastity of the plaintiff,
was shown to be false, and its -defamatory nature was conceded. Though
it was not shown that the defendants had knowledge of the writing on
their wall, there was evidence that the defendants' servant had been
advised of it by the plaintiff's husband. On plaintiff's appeal from a
nonsuit in the lower court, it was held to be a question for the jury
as to whether the defendants had a reasonable time in which to remove
the libel after their servant was informed of it.
Generally, where there has been an original publication of libelous
matter,3 one who negligently or intentionally republishes the libel is as
in his property in any lawful way, by physical improvement, psychological inducement or otherwise. His obligation to recognize the power of eminent domain
and the possibility of its exercise in no way restricts his right to a legitimate profit
... He may order his affairs in the assurance that, if the state takes his property
it will pay him the value of what it takes." Johnstone v. Detroit G. H. & M.
Ry., 245 Mich. 65, 74, 222 N. W. 325, 328 (1928). Yet it was stressed in United
States v. Certain Lands, 112 Fed. 622, 6291 (C. C. R. I. 1899) that a landowner
should not be able to increase the value of his land or impose a new burden on
the exercise of eminent domain by contracting with a private individual.
'" See note 2 .upra.
244 P. 2d 757 (Cal. 1952).
2
Ibid. The evidence was that the writing on the restroom wall indicated that
plaintiff was an unchaste woman who was not adverse to engaging in illicit amatory
ventures. It suggested, also, that anyone interested should call a stated number
and "ask for Isabelle," which was the given name of the plaintiff. An interested
"gentleman" called the plaintiff, only to find that plaintiff was a respectable married woman. He then advised the plaintiff to investigate the writing on the
tavern's restroom wall. The plaintiff immediately told her husband of the matter,
and he called the tavern and told the employee on duty there to get the writing
off the wall, and that he would be down shortly to see that it was off. The
employee informed plaintiff's husband that he was alone at the tavern and busy
and would get it off when he got around to it. After some delay, the husband
arrived with a constable, to find that the writing was still on the wall.
' Generally, libel may be defined as the intentional or negligent unlawful publication of defamatory matter in a physical form to a third person resulting in
injury to another's character in the minds of right thinking people. See NEwELL,
SLANDER AND LIBEL § 2 (4th ed. 1924) ; ODGERs, LIBEL AND SLANDER § 16 (6th ed.
1929); PROSSER, TORTS § 92 at p. 797 (1941); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 568 (1)
(1938) ; 53 C. J. S. Libel and Slander § 1 (a, 2) (1948).
In RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 577 (1938), it is stated that "publication of defamatory matter is its communication intentionally or by a negligent act to one
other than the person defamed"; and ODERs, LIBEL AND SLANDER § 132 (6th
ed. 1929) states that in order to hold one liable for publication, three things must
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guilty as the original publisher 4 Yet, in both instances, the'burden
of proving the publication of the libel remains on the plaintiff.5
In the instant case, the alleged liability of the defendants was predicated upon a negligent republication of the libel. The negligence
was that of defendants' employee (and, consequently, that of defendants)
in failing to remove the libelous matter after having been advised of the
same,6 while acting within the scope of his employment. 7 Although
the evidence in the principal case did not reveal the identity of the
original publisher of the libel, such evidence was unnecessary; for the
original authorship of a libel is immaterial in determining the liability
of one who republishes the same. 8 Consequently, since the defendants
did not attempt to use privilege or truth as a defense, 9 that there was
concur: "first, the defendant must receive the libel and read it for himself, or
in some other way become aware that it is or probably may be, a libel; next,
he must deliver it to some third person; and then that third person must read
it or hear or understand its contents"; See Horton v. Jackson, 87 Ark. 528, 133
S. W. 45 (1908) (lack of knowledge as a defense) ; 33 Am. JuR. Libel and Slander
§ 91 (1941) (negligence as basis of liability).
'Doyal v. Atlanta Journal Co., 82 Ga. App. 321, 60 S. E. 2d 802 (1950),
rehearing denied, 84 Ga. App. 122, 65 S. E. 2d 432 (1951) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 581 (b) (1938); cf. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 577 (1938).
'Buckwalter v. Gossow, 75 Kan. 147, 88 Pac. 742 (1907).
'In the principal case, there was no proof that defendants had actual knowledge of or were negligent concerning the writing on the restroom wall; however, it was proved that their employee did know of the libelous matter, and the
defendants are chargeable with the knowledge of their employee while acting
within the scope of his employment. Randall Dairy Co. v. Pewely Dairy Co.,
291 Ill. App. 380, 9 N. E. 2d 657 (1937) ; Breedings Dania Drug Co. v. Runyon,
147 Fla. 123, 2 So. 2d 376 (1941); Dressel v. Parr Cement Co., 80 Cal. App. 2d
536, 181 P. 2d 962 (1947).
"See Note, 20 MINN. L. Rav. 805, 807 (1936) wherein the requirements to
hold a master liable for defamatory publication by his servant are stated as
follows: "(1) that there is a master-servant relationship and (2) that the servant was acting in the scope of his employment." Cf., Fogg v. Boston and L. R.
Corp., 148 Mass. 513, 20 N. E. 109 (1889) (ratification of servant's act though
not in scope of employment); Choctaw Coal and Mining Co. v. Lillich, 204 Ala.
533, 86 So. 383 (1920) (liability of corporation for libel published by employee) ;
Pa. Iron Works Co. v. Henry Voght Mach. Co., 139 Ky. 497, 96 S. W. 551
(1906) (liability of corporation for act of agent); Robinson v. McAhaney, 214
N. C. 180, 198 S. E. 647 (1938) (ratification of servant's act).
'Doyal v. Atlanta Journal Co., 82 Ga. App. 321, 60 S. E. 2d 802 (1950),
relearing denied, 84 Ga. App. 122, 65 S.E. 2d 432 (1951); cf., Wayne Works v.
Hicks Body Co., Inc., 115 Ind. App. 10, 55 N. E. 2d 382 (1944). See 53 C. J.S.
Libel and Slander § 86 (1948) wherein it is said: "The maker of a republication,
although not liable for the results of the primary publication, unless it is shown
that he also made it or participated in making it is liable for the consequences of
the subsequent publication which he makes or participates in making. It is no
justification that the defamatory matter was previously published by a third
person."

'In the principal case, the falsity of the writing was shown by the evidence,
and there was no suggestion of privilege; however, in actions for libel, the defenses of truth and privilege are available to a defendant. Pennington v. Little,
266 Ky. 750, 99 S.W. 2d 776 (1936); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Davidson, 194
Okla. 115, 148 P. 2d 468 (1944); Tennant v. F. C. Whitney and Sons, 133 Wash.
581, 234 Pac. 666 (1925).
Also, the defamatory nature of the writing was conceded, probably because
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a republication of the libel was qualified only by the question as to
whether their employee had a reasonable time in which to remove the
libel after being informed of it."0
It was implied by the. court in the principal case that the owners
of the tavern should be given a reasonable time in which to remove the
libel from their wall after they became constructively aware of it, and
that failure to remove it thereafter would constitute republication. In
Byrne v. Deane," cited as the basic authority in the principal case,
there was dictum to the effect that a person should not be held liable
for republication under the circumstance where it would cause great expense and trouble to remove the libel. But the evidence given in the
instant case gave no clear indication as to how difficult the job of removal would have been if the the employee had "got around to it."
It follows from the decision in the instant case that owners of premises will have to remove libelous writings from their walls within a
"reasonable time" after they become aware of such, through their own
senses,1 2 or those of their employees acting within the scope of their
employment;13 failure to do so will subject the owner to liability for
republishing a libel. Depending on the court's interpretation of a
"reasonable time" in which to remove the libel, we are faced with the
possibility of an undue burden being placed on the owners of premises
that have public restrooms, where such writings most frequently appear.
Are the owners to be required to obliterate the libelous writings as soon
as they have actual or constructive knowledge that it appears on their
walls? Perhaps it can be easily obliterated, or it may require painting
or even woodwork to obliterate it. It seems reasonable, as suggested in
Byrne v. Deane, to consider the relative ease with which the libel might
be removed and the trouble and expense to the owner in removing it
in determining what is a "reasonable time" for its removal. It might
be that the owner would be under a duty to inspect his restroom for
it challenged the chastity of the plaintiff, and, therefore, was considered libelous
per se. See RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 559 (1938) which states: "A communication

is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him
in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating

with him"; cf., Roth v. Greensboro News Co., 217 N. C. 13, 6 S. E. 2d 882
(1940)

(distinction between words libelous per se and per quod); Flake v.

Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 785, 195 S. E. 55, 59 (1938) where it was
said that: "the three classes of libel are (1) publications obviously defamatory
which are termed libels per se, (2) publications susceptible of two interpretations, one defamatory and the other not, and (3) publications not obviously

defamatory, but which become so when considered in connection with innuendo,
colloquium and explanatory circumstances, which are termed libels per quod."

See also N. C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 99-4 (1943, recompiled 1950).

See note 6 supra.'
"1. K. B. 818, 157 L. T. R. 10 (C. A. 1937).
See ODGEs, LIBEL AND SLANDER § 132 (6th ed. 1929).
'-

13Breedings Dania Drug Co. v. Runyon, 147 Fla. 123, 2 So. 2d 376 (1941).
See note 7 supra.
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such writings if he knew that such had regularly occurred in the past.' 4
Possibly, this knowledge would require more prompt action on the part
of the owner in removing the libel than if such writings were a rarity.
Further, a restroom wall is not the only place that the owner of
premises could be held responsible for republication of libel. 15 The
mode of republication is immaterial,' 5 but if the libel is unusual or
subtle,' 7 this may be another factor to consider in arriving at a "reasonable time" for removal.
Apparently, the courts have not been called upon frequently to
decide a fact situation such as was presented in the instant case. North
Carolina, too, seems to be lacking any such cases. Clearly, there is
a great potential, since libelous writings in restrooms seem to be common occurrences, and therefore, the persons who furnish restrooms
in connection with restaurants, stores, bus stations, etc., may be held to
a constructive notice of all writings on the walls. To avoid a charge
of negligence, regular inspection may be required, followed by removal
within a reasonable time.
Hellar v. Bianco could be the impetus for more litigation, which,
it is submitted, should be governed by a liberal interpretation of "a
reasonable time for removal," taking into account such factors as mentioned above and considering that the defendant is usually the victim of
an unknown third party and has no personal malice toward the person
libeled.' 8
ELTON C. PRIDGEN.
"See Note, 16 TEx. L. REv. 115 (1938).
It Fogg v. Boston and L. R. Co., 148 Mass. 513, 20 N. E. 109 (1889)

(notice

in ticket office of Ry. company); Rosenberg v. J. C. Penney Co., 30 Cal. App.
2d 609, 86 P. 2d 696 (1939) (placard in window) ; cf. Thompson v. Adelberg &
Berman, Inc., 181 Ky. 487, 205 S. W. 558 (1918) (creditor's notices) ; Walker v.
Sheehan, 80 Ga. App. 606, 56 S. E. 2d 628 (1949) (collector's notices) ; Tidmore
v. Mills, 33 Ala. App. 243, 32 So. 2d 769, cert. denied, 249 Ala. 648, 32 So. 2d
782 6(1947) (placard on building).
" Freeman v. Busch Jewelry Co., 98 F. Supp. 963, 966 (N. D. Ga. 1951).
But see N. C. Gsx. STAT. § 99-2 (1943, recompiled 1950) (retraction law applicable only to libels by newspapers, periodicals, radio and television).
" Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 786, 195 S. E. 55, 60 (1938)
(the standard is how ordinary people would naturally understand the alleged
libel, not supersensitive persons).
" Doyal v. Atlanta Journal Co., 82 Ga. App. 321, 60 S. E. 2d 802 (1950),
rehearing denied, 84 Ga. App. 122, 65 S. E. 2d 432 (1951). But cf. O'Connor v.
Field, 266 App. Div. 121, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 492 (1943); 53 C. J. S. Libel and
Slander § 252 (1948) wherein it is stated that "the defendant may show in
mitigation of damages that the libel or slander was published under an honest
conviction of its truth or that he otherwise acted in good faith and without
malice."
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Negligence-Slippery Floors-Evidence Required
For Prima Facie Case
A long line of North Carolina decisions has made it clear that for
a customer to recover from a store proprietor for injuries sustained
from a fall on a slippery and dangerous floor, he must establish either
of these elements of actionable negligence :1 (1) that the dangerous
condition was created by the defendant, or (2) that this condition had
existed for such a length of time that he knew, or in the exercise of
2
ordinary care should have known of its existence.
It is clear that negligence is not required to be shown by direct
evidence, but may be inferred from the facts and attendant circumstances. 3 So long as the negligence of defendant may be inferred as
a reasonable probability,4 the case cannot be withdrawn from the jury.5
In past cases of this class where plaintiffs were allowed recovery, however, there was direct evidence establishing proof of these elements.0
To illustrate, in Bowden v. Kress & Co. 7 there was evidence showing
that the defendant oiled his floors every Saturday night; evidence of'In addition to the elements listed in the text which concern the breach of the
defendant's duty to the plaintiff, there must, of course, be established a duty
owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, and that the breach of that duty was the
proximate cause of the injury. However, this comment will be concerned only
with the elements establishing the breach of the defendant's duty, since they are
the controversial ones in Lee v. Green & Co., 236 N. C. 83, 72 S. E. 2d 33 (1952).
'Harris v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 230 N. C. 485, 58 S. E. 2d 536 (1949) ;
Pratt v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 218 N. C. 732, 12 S. E. 2d 242 (1940); King
v. Thackers, Inc., 207 N. C. 869, 178 S. E. 95 (1935). For a collection of these
cases see Harris v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra.
'Wyrick v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 224 N. C. 301, 29 S. E. 2d 900 (1944);
Etheridge v. Etheridge, 222 N. C. 616, 24 S. E. 2d 477 (1943) ; Corum v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 205 N. C. 213, 171 S. E. 78 (1933); Lynch v. Carolina
Tel. & Tel. Co., 204 N. C. 252, 167 S. E. 847 (1933); Rainey v. Virginia and
Carolina Southern Ry., 168 N. C. 570, 84 S. E. 851 (1915).
'"The rule is well settled that if there be no evidence, or if the evidence be
so slight as not reasonably to warrant the inference of the fact in issue or furnish
more than material for a mere conjecture, the court will not leave the issue to
be passed on by the jury." Mount Olive Manufacturing Co. v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. R., 233 N. C. 661, 670, 65 S. E. 2d 379, 386 (1951).
2Tysinger
v. Coble Dairy Products, 225 N. C. 717, 36 S. E. 2d 246 (1945);
Mitchell v. Melts, 220 N. C. 793, 18 S. E. 2d 406 (1942) and cases cited therein.
As Chief Justice Stacy said in State v. Johnson, 199 N. C. 429, 431, 154 S. E.
730, 731 (1930)

" . . . if there be any evidence tending to prove the fact in

issue, or which reasonably conduces to its conclusion as a fairly logical and legitimate deduction, and not merely such as raises a suspicion or conjecture in regard
to it, the case should be submitted to the jury."
Determining the sufficiency of the evidence is a matter of law. Tysinger v.
Coble Dairy Products, supra; Mitchell v. Melts, supra; Mills v. Moore, 219 N. C,
25, 30, 12 S. E. 2d 661, 663 (1941).
'Anderson v. Reidsville Amusement Co., 213 N. C. 130, 195 S. E. 386 (1938);
Parker v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 201 N. C. 691, 161 S. E. 209 (1931); Bowden
v. S. H. Kress & Co., 198 N. C. 559, 152 S. E. 625 (1930). See Harris v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 230 N. C. 485, 53 S. E. 2d 536 (1949); and Brown v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 217 N. C. 368, 8 S. E. 2d 199 (1940) where judgments were reversed on other grounds.
1198 N. C. 559, 152 S. E. 625 (1930).
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fered by the defendant in Parker v. Tea Co.8 tended to show that he
oiled the floor on Saturday night and that the plaintiff fell on Monday
morning; and in Anderson v. Amusement Co.9 defendant's witness
testified that the -defendant used liquid floor wax on the linoleum. In
previous decisions where the plaintiff did not offer direct evidence to
prove either the creation of the dangerous condition by the defendant
or his knowledge of its existence, the North Carolina Court apparently
did not see fit to say that the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant was negligent, and judgments as of nonsuit were accordingly
affirmed.' 0 Undoubtedly the reason is that the particular facts, of these
cases would not substantiate, as a reasonable probability, the inference
that the defendant created the slippery condition, or that he knew or
should have known of such condition.'"
In view of these prior decisions, our Supreme Court, in the recent
case of Lee v. Green & Co.,' 2 took a liberal step in allowing the plaintiff to carry her case to the jury. The plaintiff testified that she slipped
and fell in the aisle of defendant's store on a place that was "dark,
greasy, and slippery looking." 13 Other testimony, given by plaintiff's
husband, showed that the floor was examined immediately after the
fall; that it was greasy all the way across; that the oil was fresh
at some places and dry at others; and that the place where plaintiff
fell was slick.' 4 With no other evidence offered, the court held four
to three, in reversing a judgment as of nonsuit, that the existence of
the necessary elements of actionable negligence could reasonably be
inferred from the whole of the evidence, which was sufficient to make
a prima facie case for the jury.
While the decision in the principal case represents the first time our
8201 N. C. 691, 161 S. E. 209 (1931).
0213 N. C. 130, 195 S. E. 386 (1938).
"0Fanelty v. Rogers Jewelers, Inc., 230 N. C. 694, 55 S. E. 2d 493 (1949);
Pratt v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 218 N. C. 732, 12 S. E. 2d 242 (1940); Fox v.

Great A. & P. Tea Co., 209 N. C. 115, 182 S.E. 662 (1935) ; King v. Thackers,
Inc., 207 N. C. 869, 178 S. E. 95 (1935); Cooke v. Great A. & P. Tea Co. and
Shepard, 204 N. C. 495, 168 S. E. 679 (1933).
"'Fanelty v. Rogers Jewelers, Inc., 230 N. C. 694, 55 S. E. 2d 493 (1949)

(plaintiff slipped on a slick place at the entrance of the store) ; Pratt v. Great
A. & P. Tea Co., 218 N. C. 732, 12 S.E. 2d 242 (1940) (greasy substance covered
only 8 or 10 inches); Fox v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 209 N. C. 115, 182 S.E.
662 (1935) (plaintiff slipped and fell on a beet in the aisle) ; Cooke v. Great
A. & P. Tea Co., 204 N. C. 495, 168 S. E. 679 (1933) (plaintiff slipped and fell
on a banana peeling). But see King v. Thackers, Inc., 207 N. C. 869, 178 S.E.
95 (1935) where corn meal was on the floor in the restaurant's kitchen in heavy
and light places; the court reaches the same result, but it is the opinion of this
writer that the circumstances would have warranted'a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff.
12236 N. C. 83, 72 S.E. 2d 33 (1952).

"Id. at 84, 72 S. E. 2d at 34.

,Plaintiff also testified that she got oil on her clothing and arm, and that
some of the oil went through her hose onto her skin.
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Supreme Court has said that a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in this
type case would be warranted on the basis of circumstancial evidence,
other jurisdictions have, for a number of years, expressed a willingness to go this far. 15 Recognizing that the particular facts of each
case are of the utmost importance in determining whether or not that
case may go to the jury, there is still a certain personal element involved, for individual judges undoubtedly differ in their attitudes toward the submission of cases to the jury.
The court is careful to point out that while allowing a prima fade
case to be established, it is in no sense applying the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur.'0 One of the basic requirements for the application of
res ipsa loquitur is that the instrumentality causing the plaintiff's injury be under the exclusive control or management of the defendant.
In the cases of slippery substances on floors, it cannot be said that the
defendant is in exclusive control or management of his floor, because
members of the public may create the dangerous condition. Consequently, the courts do not resort to the application of that doctrine;
rather, they determine whether the creation of the dangerous condition by the defendant is a reasonable inference from the whole of the
evidence. In either instance, the plaintiff has his case submitted to
the jury. There is this -distinction however: Where res ipsa. toquitur
is applicable the plaintiff must show only the physical cause of the
accident; where it is not applicable, as in the principal case, the plain1
Plaintiff slipped on an oily puddle at the paint counter in defendant's store.
The court said, "There was no direct evidence as to how long the puddle was on
the floor but, . . . that fact, like other facts, may be proved by circumstantial
" Ahern v. S. H. Kress & Co., 97 Cal. App.
as well as by direct evidence ....
2d 691, 218 P. 2d 108 (1950).
There was no direct evidence as to how or by whom the decayed fruit substance, on which the plaintiff fell, was placed on the floor. The court said, "In
the case at bar there is evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer it
was more probable that the condition was created by the defendant." Fox v.
Ben Schechter & Co., 57 Ohio App. 275, 13 N. E. 2d 730 (1937).
" Lee v. Green & Co., 236 N. C. 83, 85, 72 S. E. 2d 33, 35 (1952). That
the doctrine does not apply to cases involving foreign substances on floors is
well settled. Harris v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 230 N. C. 485, 486, 53 S. E.
2d 536, 538 (1949); Barnes v. Hotel O'Henry Corporation, 229 N. C. 730, 731,
51 S. E. 2d 180, 181 (1949); Pratt v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 218 N. C. 732,
733, 12 S. E. 2d 242 (1940); Parker v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 201 N. C. 691,
692, 161 S. E. 209, 210 (1931); Bowden v. S. H. Kress & Co., 198 N. C. 559,
561, 152 S. E. 625, 626 (1930).
Other jurisdictions likewise hold the doctrine inapplicable to these situations.
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Lamberson, 144 F. 2d 97, 99 (9th Cir. 1944) ;, F. W.
Woolworth Co. v. Ney, 239 Ala. 233, 235, 194 So. 667, 669 (1940); Maple v.
Manspeaker, 88 Cal. App. 682, 263 P. 1022, 1023 (1928) ; Powell v. L. Feibleman
& Co., 187 So. 130, 131 (La. App. 1939); Coyne v. Mutual Grocery Co., 116
N. J. L. 36, 181 Atl. 314, 315 (1935) ; Reay v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 154 Pa.
Super. 119, 120, 35 A. 2d 558, 559 (1944); Tenbrink v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,
153 Atl. 245 (R. I. 1931); Martin v. Miller Bros. Co., 26 Tenn. App. 110, 117,
168 S. W. 2d 187, 190 (1942); Cooper v. Pritchard Motor Co., 128 W. Va. 312,
318, 36 S.E. 2d 405, 408 (1945).
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tiff must show circumstances pointing to both the physical and the
17
responsible human cause of the accident.
In the final analysis the principal case neither changes the duty of
the proprietor,18 nor does it lessen the elements to be proved by the
plaintiff1
However, the case does express a willingness on the part
of our court to allow a plaintiff to have either of these necessary elements inferred from convincing circumstancial evidence. There will
undoubtedly be many instances where a plaintiff will be unable to obtain
direct proof of either of these elements of actionable negligence. He
may then offer circumstantial evidence from which one of the elements
may be inferred. That is as far as the court has gond in this case.
The case does not, as the dissent suggests, support the proposition that
a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case merely by proving that
there was some slippery substance on the floor where she fell. Each
case must be -decided on the facts peculiar to it, and there is no question
that as past cases of this type are distinguishable on their facts, so is
20
the principal case distinguishable from all others.
DURWARD S. JONES.

Railroads-Abandonments and Partial Discontinuances of Passenger
Service-Jurisdiction-Factors in Determining
Since 1916, when railroad mileage in the United States reached its
2
peak,1 there has been a steady reduction of trackage and service.
" For an excellent distinction between circumstantial evidence and res ipsa
loquitur, see Harris v. Mangum, 183 N. C. 235, 237, 111 S. E. 177, 178 (1922)
(quoted in Howard v. Texas Co., 205 N. C. 20, 23, 169 S. E. 832, 834 (1933).
1" The proprietor
is not an insurer, but owes to customers the duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and t>
give warning of unsafe conditions in so far as can be ascertained by reasonable
inspection. For a collection of cases so holding see Fanelty v. Rogers Jewelers,
Inc., 230 N. C. 694, 699, 55 S. E. 2d 493, 497 (1949).
i'See note 1 supra.
" The facts of past cases of this class did not warrant their submission to
the jury in the absence of direct evidence; with the possible exception of King
v. Thackers, Inc., 207 N. C. 869, 178 S.E. 95 (1935).
'In that year there were 435,745 miles of track in operation. See AsSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION, A STATISTICAL
REcoRD (1951).
Miles of track in North Carolina reached a peak of 5,522 in
1920. See ICC, STATISTICS OF RAILROADS IN U. S. (1951).
2 Statistics on abandonments are available only from 1920, when the ICC was
given juristiction over abandonments under the Transportation Act of that year.
By 1945 there had been 33,513 abandoned miles of trackage in the United States,
613 of them being in North Carolina. See CHERINGTON, THE REGULATION OF
RAILROAD ABANDONMENT 105 (1948).
There Were five additional abandonments
in North Carolina between 1945 and 1948 inclusive, cutting the railroad trackage
in the state to 4,554 miles. The figures were derived from individual abandonments in REPORT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION (1945-46, 1947-

48).

No statistics are available indicating the reduction of trains nationally,

although between 1945 and 1948 inclusive, 14 daily passenger trains were discontinued in North Carolina.
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Among the causes of reduction in passenger service, 3 and the one of
greatest present-day importance, is competition from other forms of
4
transportation; namely, the bus, airplane and private automobile.
Therefore, until the railroads can better their competitive position or
until they come merely to serve a certain limited segment of the traveling public, the Interstate Commerce Commission and our state commissions will be called on to continue to grant abandonments and discontinuances.
Reductions in service are of two types: (1) complete abandonments of certain lines or branches, and (2) partial discontinuances of
service.

The authority to abandon all or any segment of an interstate railroad, that is, one extending into two or more states, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission.5 It has
power to authorize a complete abandonment of an interstate line as to
both interstate and intrastate commerce because interstate commerce
is involved. "Control is exerted over intrastate commerce only because such control is a necessary incident of freeing interstate commerce from the unreasonable burdens, obstruction or unjust discriminations which are found to result ....
6
Where, however, a purely intrastate railroad is involved; i. e., the
tracks of a railroad lie wholly within one state and the railroad is
being operated independently and not as a branch of any railroad engaged in interstate commerce, the Interstate Commerce Commission's
authority is limited to the abandonment of the interstate business, rather
than both the interstate and intrastate business. 7 "[The railroad's]
continued operation solely in intrastate commerce cannot be of more
than local concern. Intrastate and foreign commerce will not be burdened or affected by any shortage in the earnings, nor will any carrier
in such commerce have to bear or make good the shortage."8 The

' This article pertains only to reductions in passenger service. Fundamental
causes of such reductions may be divided conveniently into five categories: (1)
Competition from other forms of transportation; (2) readjustments in railroad
operating practices in a given area; (3) exhaustion or depletion of natural resources, or the closing or dismantlement of non-transportation facilities; (4)
legal changes in the status of the operating railroad or of the particular segment;
and (5) miscellaneous or unknown causes. See CHERINGTON, op. cit. supra note
2, at 108.
' In North Carolina alone there are 847,331 registered motor vehicles, five
commercial airlines serving 13 cities, and 101 motor passenger carriers. See
NORTH CAROLINA ALMANAC 1951.

349 U. S. C. § 1 (18-20)

(1948), Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153

(1925); Central N. E. Ry. v. B. & A. R. R., 279 U. S. 415 (1923).
' Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153, 163 (1925). This case involved
a branch line, wholly within one state, of an interstate carrier, which branch
was doing both intrastate and interstate business.
'Texas v. Eastern Texas Ry., 258 U. S. 204 (1922).

' Id. at 216.

Rarely, however, will a carrier wish to, or be able to operate
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abandonment of the remaining intrastate business is within the jurisdiction of the state. In North Carolina this authority is placed in the
Utilities Commission.0 As" every projected abandonment of any part
of a railroad engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce may
conceivably involve a conflict between state and national interests;" Congress provided means for cooperation between the state and the federal
government."°
Jurisdiction as to a partial discontinuance, 11 as contrasted with a
complete abandonment, is with the state; for every state has the exclusive right to regulate passenger service on all railroad lines wholly
within its borders. This is true even where these lines are a part of
an interstate rail network, or where the train or trains involved run
between two or more states transporting interstate passengers. 12 The
Interstate Commerce Commission has held that it has no authority to
authorize a partial discontinuance as such.' 3 Therefore, until Congress
grants the Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction over partial
discontinuances, the states will be free to regulate passenger service
within their boundaries even though the trains run without the state
and interstate commerce will be affected.
Most states, in regulating public utilities within their respective
borders, have given authority to a commission to see that railroads
provide reasonably adequate passenger service. 14 A few states, like
North Carolina, provide by statute what minimum service shall be
once it has been authorized to abandon its interstate business; and it may be
deprived of its property under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it is not then allowed to abandon its intrastate business as well. So, in
practical effect, the ICC has exclusive jurisdiction in all abandonments. See
Bullock v. Railroad Comm'n, 254 U. S. 513 (1920); Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 251 U. S.396 (1919).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §62-96 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
1 49 U. S. C. § 13 (3)
(1948). For a discussion of cooperation between federal and state regulatory bodies, see Lindahl, Cooperation Between the Interstate Commerce Conmission and The State Commissions in Railroad Regulation,
33 MxcH. L. REv. 338, 357 (1934). State regulatory bodies, having an intimate
knowledge of local conditions and being appreciative of local interests and needs,
may hold the original hearings pertaining to an abandonment. Recommendations as to the disposition of the cases are forwarded to the ICC. Members of
a state regulatory body might also sit with members of the ICC when an abandonment is under determination. Statistics indicate that these provisions are
often put into practice.
" A discontinuance of one or more, or all, of several passenger trains is a
partial discontinuance and not an abandonment.
2 Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U. S. 341 (1951);
New York Central R. R., 254 L C. C. 745, 765 (1944); Kansas City Southern
R. R., 94 I.C.C. 691 (1925).
" New York Central R. R., 254 I. C. C. 745, 765 (1944); Kansas City
Southern R. R., 94 I. C. C. 691 (1925).
"Delaware appears to be the only state without a utilities commission or its
equivalent.
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furnished, 15 but empower the commission to authorize a "railroad company to cease the operation of passenger trains as long as the convenience and necessity of the traveling public [do] not require such
operation."' 16 While most state statutes are silent on the explicit
authority of a commission to grant discontinuances, such authority is
implicit in the agency's supervision over the service of common carriers
within the state.17 Also, it is the general rule that the commission
must hold a hearing, either upon its own motion or upon petition of
the carrier, before the carrier will be allowed to discontinue any
service.' 8
Despite the jurisdictional differences as to abandonments and partial
discontinuances, the factors in making a case for either are essentially
alike.19
"5 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 350.16 (1944) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 479.5 (1949) ; N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 62-47 (1943 Recomp. 1950) (At least one passenger train must be
ran each way daily except Sunday.)
"N. C. GEN. STAT. § 62-47 (1950). Other statutes, see note 15 supra, contain similar provisions. This authorization to relax the minimum requirements has certain advantages. Since railroad charters or franchises are generally
governed by contract rules, and the statutory requirement would therefore become
a part of the contract, the cessation of a particular required service would otherwise be prohibited as a breach of contract. See Field, The Withdrawal From
Service of Public Utility Companies, 35 YALE L. J. 169 (1923); and State v.
Enid, 0. & W. Ry., 103 Tex. 239, 191 S. W. 560 (1917). However, when a
railroad is authorized to abandon, it no longer continues to exercise the privileges conferred by its charter. Texas R. R. Comm'n v. Eastern Texas R. R.,
264 U. S. 79 (1923). Hence, without the "relaxing" provision, railroads suffering losses on operations might seek authority to abandon lines rather than
discontinue certain losing operations. Texas & N. E. R. R. v. Railroad Comm'n,
145 Tex. 541, 200 S. W. 2d 626 (1947). Some courts do not follow the "contract theory," applying instead an expanded concept of due process which holds
that a carrier is deprived of property without due process of law if it is required
to furnish service on a particular line which is not required in the public interest
or which is losing money. See State of Washington v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510
(1912) ; Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 42 P. U. R. (N. S.) 417 (1950).
"7This is attested by discontinuance hearings in states which do not mention
such authority in their statutes. E. g., Public Service Comm'n v. Capital Transit, 80 P. U. R. (N. S.) 513 (Md. 1949) ; Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 42
P. U. R. (N. S.) 417 (N. J. 1942); Union Pacific R. R., 40 P. U. R. (N. S.)
498 (Utah 1941); Colorado & Southern Ry., P. U. R. 1927E 1 (Colo.); Union
Pacific
R. R., P. U. R. 1926B 541 (Neb.).
8
" ALA. CODE tit. 48 § 106 (1940); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216.62 (West 1945);

N. H. Rxv. LAws c. 289, § 26 (1942); Nay. ComP. LAWs ANN. § 504-3 (1929);

N. M. STAT. ANN. § 74-401 (1941); N. C. GEN. STAT. § 62-47 (1943 Recomp.
1950) ; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 504-3 (1946) ; S. C. CODE ANN. § 8250 (1942) ;
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 5398 (Williams 1934); Tax. STAT. ANN. § 6479 (1951);

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2563 (1949); Wis. STAT. § 196-81 (1951). The requirement of hearing before a discontinuance may be allowed is illustrated by a recent
instance in North Carolina. The Norfolk Southern Ry. made public notice of
discontinuance and withdrew its trains without a hearing. The Utilities Commission ordered a hearing before there could be discontinuance.
" However, an order authorizing a complete abandonment of a line is not
conditioned on a finding that operation will prejudice interstate commerce, or
that a railroad will be prevented from earning a fair return on its properties
as a whole, or that the entire intrastate business in a state involved will not
earn a fair return on property used therein. The sole test is whether abandon-
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Substantial losses for the particular operation are usually the motivating factor in seeking discontinuance, and there is also no doubt
that the financial ability of the carrier to continue operations has constituted one of the main tests of convenience and necessity. A stronger
case is presented if the carrier is able to show that the total operating
costs exceed the total operating revenues. Although questions sometimes arise over what constitutes revenue or a proper expense,0
such controversies are greatly diminished by the Uniform System of
Accounts, prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, 2 1 along
22
with periodic interpretations of accounting classifications.
However, a mere showing of pecuniary loss from a particular operation is not of itself sufficient to justify a discontinuance. "Unlike a department store or a grocery, a railroad cannot of its own free will discontinue a particular service to the public because an item of its business has
become unprofitable."' ' A failure to show that the railroad as a whole is
operating at a loss, or failing to receive a fair return on its total investment,24 will tip the scales toward a -denial of discontinuance; however, in
considering the confiscatory effect of a commission's actions, the railroad's income from sources other than its railroad operations should not
be taken into account. 25 " . . . even where a carrier's operations as a
whole are reasonably profitable it has been held in various cases that
it should not be required to continue the operation of passenger trains
that show such disproportionate losses as to indicate that they are not
ment is consistent with public necessity and convenience.

States, 271 U. S.153 (1926);

Colorado v. United

SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CoMMIS-

SION 331 (1935).

For information on basic data to be furnished in making application to the
Interstate Commerce Commission, see ICC, IN THE MATTm OF APPLICATIONS
UNDER PARAGRAPHS (18) to (21), INcLusE, SECTION I, OF THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE ACT FOR CERTIFICATES OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY AUTHORIZING

THE ABANDONMENT

OF LINES OF RAILROAD OR THE OPERATION THEREOF

(July

8, 1921).
0 See Atlantic Coast Line R. R v. Public Service Comm'n, 77 F. Supp. 675
(E. D. S. C. 1948); Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. R. v. Public Service Comm'n,
221 Ind. I,46 N. E. 2d 230 (1943) ; New York Central R. R. v. Public Utilities
Comm'n, 129 Ohio St. 381, 195 N. E. 566 (1935); Southern Ry. v. Commonwealth,
193 Va. 291, 68 S. E. 2d 552 (1952).
1

UNIFORM SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTS FOR STEAM RAILROADS PRESCRIBED BY THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMiISSION IN ACCORDANCE VITH SECTION 20 PART I
OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT (1943).
"2 INTERPRETATIONS OF ACCOUNTING CLASSIFICATIONS PRESCRIBED BY THE INTER-

STATE COMMERCE COMMISSION FOR STEAM RAILROADS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SEC20 PART I OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT (1943). See WERMOUTH,
RAILROAD ACCOUNTS AND STATISTICS (1924).

TION

" Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern

Ry., 341 U. S. 341, 352 (1951)

(concurring opinion).

See Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U. S.341 (1951).
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Public Service Comm'n, 77 F. Supp. 675
(E. D. S. C. 1948).
22
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substantially used or needed by the public." 28 The very fact that a
line of railroad does not pay the expense of running some of its trains
is cogent evidence that public convenience and necessity does not re27
quire that they be kept in operation.
Many railroads have numerous short lines which act as feeders to
main lines, and which could not be operated independently of the main
lines. While many main-line trains make substantial profits, those
profits are diluted by the losses on unprofitable branch-line operations. 28
Consequently, in determining the reasonableness of any branch line
service, the relation of the branch line to the system as a whole, from
the standpoint of costs, volume of business, connections, and through
service, must be considered.
The character and population of the territory served are important
factors. 66% of North Carolina's population is rural,80 and even
though the percentage of rural population is decreasing,81 the over-all
increase in the state's population82 keeps the rural population high. Of
the remaining 34% of North Carolina's population which is in urban
areas, 8 26% is within cities of 50,000 to 100,000. Rural areas and
small urban communities tend to depend more on railroad passenger
service; nevertheless, a railroad cannot afford to suffer disproportionate losses in order to serve them.
A case for discontinuance is materially strengthened when alternative services are available, whether over the lines of the applicant car" Id. at 686. See also Mississippi R. R. Comm'n v. Mobile & Ohio R. R.,
244 U. S. 389 (1916); North Pacific R. R. v. Montana R. R. Comm'n, 46 F.
Supp 340 (D. Mont. 1942); Delaware, L. & W. R. R. v. Van Santwood, 216
Fed. 252 (N. D. N. Y. 1914); Blease v. Charleston & W. C. R. R., 146 S. C.
496, 144 S. E. 233 (1928); REPORT OF NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION
288 (1947-48).
Public Convenience Certificate to D. & N. M. Ry., 71 1. C. C. 795 (1922).
"The average operating ratio (operating costs divided by operating revenues,
expressed by a percentage) for passenger service on Class I railroads (those
having operating revenues over $1,000,000 annually) was 136.6 in 1949. See
AssocrATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, A REvIEw OF RAILWAY OPERATIONS IN
1950 8 (1951). It is recognized that many main-line trains, especially streamliners, are highly successful. The "Silver Meteor" of the Seaboard Air Line
Ry., for example, earned $2,973,930 on a gross of $5,445,699. See Profits it
Streamliners, FORTUNE May, 1950, p. 78.
"Gardner v. Commerce Comm'n, 400 IIl. 123, 79 N. E. 2d 71 (1948) ; Abandonment of Branch by Pere Marquette. 72 L C. C. 303 (1922) ; Abandonment of
Branch by Green Bay & W. R. R., 72 I. C. C. 647 (1922).
"BUREAU

OF THE

CENsuS,

1950 UNIED

STATES

CENSUS

OF POPULATION

P-A33, 7 (1950).
"Ibid. The 1940 rural population was 73%.
"' There has been an increase from 3,571,623 in 1940 to 4,061,929 in 1950, or

13.7%.

" Under the urban definition established for use in the 1950 census, the urban
population comprises all persons living in (a) incorporated places of 2,500 or
more; (b) the densely settled urban fringe, including both incorporated and unincorporated areas, around cities of 50,000 or more; and (c) unincorporated
places of 2,500 inhabitants or more outside an urban fringe. There are 107
such areas in North Carolina.
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tier or some other railroad, 4 or merely by virtue of the existence of
adequate highways or bus service.8 5 Of the 34 railroads which operate
in North Carolina, only four 36 provide daily passenger service. These
four railroads operate a total of 74 daily trains,3 7 but 40 of these trains
are operated on main north-south lines. There would seem to be less
likelihood that one of these main-line trains, as distinguished from a
branch-line train, would be discontinued permanently, but even if this
occurred, there would be several remaining trains. The remaining 34
trains serve communities on only ten branch lines, and while these
communities would be more adversely affected by discontinuances, almost all communities would be served by as frequent bus service if all
passenger trains were withdrawn.3 8 In addition to the trains are the
thousands of automobiles 9 using the 63,600 miles of roads in North
Carolina,40 and the airlines serving the major cities.
The transportation of mail is a minor factor. The postal service
is a function of the federal government, and it is the duty of the Post
Office Department to provide adequate postal service regardless of
the presence of passenger trains. 4x When passenger trains are discontinued, highway post office service is generally provided.4 Express
service also generally presents no problem, for it can usually be given
"Mississippi R. R. Comm'n v. Mobile & Ohio R. IR, 244 U. S. 388 (1917);
Atchison T. & S. F. Ry., 162 I. C. C. 474 (1930); Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. R.,
162 I. C. C. 141 (1930); Abandonment of Line by C. R. I. P. R. R., 90 I. C. C.
645 (1924).
" Chicago, B. &. Q. R. R. v. Nebraska State Ry. Comm'n, 138 Nebr. 767,
295 N. W. 389 (1940); Abandonment by Oregon E. Ry., 145 I. C. C. 449 (1928) ;
Union Pacific R. R., 40 P. U. R. (N. S.) (1941) ; Public Service Comm'n v. Delaware & Hudson R. R., 14 P. U. R. (N. S.) 326 (1935).
° Atlantic Coast Line R. R., Norfolk & Western Ry., Seaboard Air Line
R. R., and Southern Ry.
1 THE OfficIAL RAILwAY GUIDE (June, 1952).
All the figures on passenger
trains in North Carolina are based on the writer's personal count of trains from
the timetables, and in no wise indicate a count from any official source. In addition to the trains given, the Clinchfield Railroad operates one train in each
direction three times a week.
8According to bus schedules, only a few stations on the Clinchfield R. R.
would be wholly without a common carrier. Actually, this is a main-line operation, but because of the shortness of the railroad and the infrequence of the
service, it was placed in this category.
"' See note 4, supra.
"oStatistics were obtained from the North Carolina Highway and Public
Works Commission. This figure does not include the Blue Ridge Parkway,
military reservation roads, or non-system roads in national parks. Of this
mileage, as of Jan. 1, 1949, 16,282 miles were hard surface, while 47,319 miles
were non hard-surface. Under the new road building program (1949-52), 12,000
additional miles are to be hard-surfaced, and 35,000 miles of other non hardsurface roads are to be improved or all-weathered.
"Union Pacific R. R. v. Public Service Comm'n, 102 Utah 465, 132 P. 2d
128 (1942) ; Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. Illinois Central R. R., 84 P. U. R.
(N. S.) 508 (1949) ; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 34 P. U. R. (N. S.) 348 (1940).
" Highway post office service is certainly a more substantial equivalent to the
railroad postal service than star routes, which was the substitution in the past.
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as prompt service by an express carrier's own trucks, regular motor
freight, passenger carriers, or by other available trains.
Important factors are the extent to which there may have been mismanagement and failure to effectuate economies in the operation of the
line.4 A commission, in its discretion, may deny the application or dismiss it for the time being if it thinks there has been mismanagement or
if it thinks economies may be introduced. Actually, there is much
room in the railroad industry for cutting costs. There is probably no
other industry which has been more backward in modernizing its
activities, both in operations and in administration, and despite certain
44
new developments, the railroads have been obstinate in adopting them.
Clerical costs in the industry are one-seventh of total payroll. 4 72%
of operating revenues are "eaten up" by labor and material costs alone. 40
Four out of five passenger cars are more than twenty years old, 4 7 and
this may somewhat account for the per car average of only seventeen
passengers hauled per run in 1950.48 A criticism of the railroads would
be unduly harsh, however, without noting that "a railroad company has
but limited powers of management. It has no power to fix rates and
thus has little control over its revenue. Its control over expenses,
particularly wages, is also strictly limited-as the spiral of recent wage
increases abundantly indicates. It is restricted in its managerial functions by rules arising from contracts with well-integrated and nationwide labor organizations. ' 49 Surely a commission will consider this
in deciding whether there might be economies.
It is said that the railroads are faced with a serious problem, for
while modernization is needed to attract more business, they do not
have the money to finance modernization, and have difficulty attracting
the capital. 50 The failure to modernize is somewhat reflected in the
annual decrease of passenger business,8 1 despite the greatest peace-time
travel in history. Many, however, consider the problem of the railroad
"'Colorado & Southern Ry. Abandonment, 166 1.C. C. 470 (1930); Aban-

donment by Southern Ry., 131 1.C. C. 264 (1927); Abandonment of Line by
Southern Ry., 105 I. C. C. 228 (1928); Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines,
42 P.U.R. (N.S.) 417 (1942).
"See

YOUNG, NEW RAILROADS FOR ALL (1952).
"YOUNG, op. cit. supra note 44, at 2.
"ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, A REVIEW OF RAILWAY OPERATIONS
14 (1950). Materials are fuel, power, and supplies.
"YOUNG, op. cit. supra note 44, at 2.
"Figures were obtained from ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, A REVIEW OF RAILWAY OPERATIONS 14 (1950).
" Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Public Service Comm'n of S. C., 77 F. Supp.

675, 687 (E.D. S.C. 1948).
"U. S.News and World Report, Feb. 29, 1952, p. 32. Much railroad equip-

ment, however, is financed through the use of equipment trust certificates, which
find a ready market.
"ASSOCIATION
TION

32 (1950).

OF EASTERN RAILROADS,

A YEARBOOK OF RAILROAD INFORBIA-
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to be solvable and predict a good future for railroad passenger traffic.
When a commission considers a case for abandonment or partial
discontinuance, it weighs all of the above factors together. In each
case the burden of proving that the proposed abandonment or discontinuance will impose no serious hardship upon the public lies upon the
53
applicant carrier.
In the final analysis, the validity of every order of a state commission depends on a negative answer to both of these questions: (1) Does
the order constitute an undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination
against interstate commerce? 54 (2) Is the order so confiscatory as to
amount to a taking of property without due process of law, hence
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment?
An atack on an order on the theory of undue discrimination against
interstate commerce would raise the issue as to whether or not the
denial of a discontinuance might, by obliging the railroad to keep on
sustaining a loss, cause a burden to be placed on interstate commerce. 55
The usual result will be that interstate commerce will not be held burdened by a continued operation, but it is conceivable that in some instances an operation would unduly saddle the interstate traffic of a
carrier.

"2 See

MULHFELD, THE RAILROAD PROBLEF AND ITS SOLUTION (1941) ; YOUNG,
NEW RAILROADS FOR ALL (1952) ; Profits in Streandiners, FORTUNE May, 1950,
p. 78.
" Abandonment by Hill City Ry., 150 I. C. C. 159 (1928); PennsylvaniaReading Seashore Lines, 42 P. U. R. (N. S.) 417 (1942).
" The Interstate Commerce Commission has the duty of determining whether
or not an order of a state commission results in discrimination. 49 U. S. C.
§ 13 (4) (Supp. 1951). There must be a hearing before that commission before
the question may be presented to the courts. Western & A. R. R. v. Georgia
Public Service Comm'n, 267 U. S. 493 (1925).
"The question of undue discrimination has heretofore been confined, with
few exceptions, to the matter of intrastate rates; and to date, the I. C. C. has
not had occasion to decide whether a denial of a partial discontinuance might,
in some instances, constitute an undue discrimination against interstate commerce.
An analogy might be drawn with the rate cases, however, to determine what
standards might be applicable. After issuance of the order, is the intrastate traffic still "contributing its fair share of the revenue required to meet maintenance
and operating costs and to yield a fair return on the value of the property devoted to the transportation service, both interstate and intrastate." Montana
v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 778, 780 (D. Mont. 1952) (rates). The standard
for determination "in a case of this kind is not whether the intrastate traffic
is contributing its fair share of the railroad's total revenue-the question is
whether it is contributing its fair share of the revenue required to enable [the
carrier] to render adequate and efficient transportation service." Montana v. United
States, 106 F. Supp. 778, 784 (D. Mont. 1952) (rates).
This determination
necessarily involves expert analysis, and unless there is a "high standard of
certainty" that the state order constitutes an undue discrimination against interstate commerce, it will not be overridden by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Illinois Central R. R. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 245 U. S. 493, 510
(1917) (rates).
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Rarely are orders pertaining to partial discontinuances attacked
on the theory of undue discrimination against interstate commerce 0
The usual theory of attack is the one presented in question (2), viz.,
whether the order amounts to a taking of property without due process
of law. The due process question normally arises from an order denying a discontinuance or abandonment. In determining whether an order
is unreasonable or arbitrary, the court must consider, in addition to
the factors already discussed, the investment in the entire system, its
earnings as a whole, what effect the losses on the trains sought to be
discontinued have on the system as a whole, with specific considera-

tion to the relative need for maintaining this train service in the territory which would be affected by the discontinuance.5" Since passenger traffic as a whole is rarely profitable, it is clear, therefore, that
freight shippers must bear some of the burden of unprofitable passenger service. But, if the public convenience and necessity require that
the service be continued, an order requiring continuance is within the
scope of due process."8
A review of the decisions of the North Carolina Utilities Commission indicates that it has been liberal in allowing discontinuances.
There is no doubt that it is the right of carriers to seek, and of regulatory agencies to permit, the elimination of those services and facilities
that are no longer needed nor used by the public to any substantial
extent. It is also manifest that carriers are justified in reducing their
expenses, where it is practicable to do so with reasonable regard to
efficiency and without impairment of their obligations. However, the
railroads have been permitted to discontinue trains to the point that
only a skeleton of passenger service remains in this state. Since so
many unprofitable trains have been taken off, the railroads should
" One reason undoubtedly is that the carrier must present this question to the
I. C. C. first, while the question of due process may be raised on an appeal from,
or on a hearing to seek an injunction against, a commission's order. See notes
54 and 55 supra.
""Mississippi R. R. Comm'n v. Mobile & Ohio R. R., 244 U. S. 388 (1917).
It is the majority view that the earnings of the entire system will be taken into
consideration in determining the effect of the losses on the trains sought to be
discontinued. Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 91 F. Supp.
980 (M. D. Ala. 1950) rev'd on other grounds 341 U. S. 341 (1951) ; Atlantic
Coast Line R. R. v. Public Service Comm'n of S. C., 77 F. Supp. 675 (E. D.
S. C. 1948). But see Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341
U. S. 341, 352 (1951) (concurring opinion) ("No showing whatever was made
that by the loss incurred in running these trains the Southern was deprived of
that protection for its investment in Alabama which alone can be made the
basis of a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.")
A state would often seem to be an economically illogical unit in determining the
effect of losses.
"' "A railway may be compelled to continue the service of a branch or part
of a line, although the operation involves a loss ....
This is true even where the
system as a whole fails to earn a fair return upon the value of the property."
Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Bourland, 267 U. S. 330, 332 (1925).
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now be in a better position to furnish improved service, at lower operating costs, on the remaining lines. Perhaps the railroads can make the
next step in meeting competition.59
ROGER B. HENDRIX.
Torts-Assault and Battery-Provocative Words as Defense
In a recent Louisiana case,1 plaintiff sued defendant for assault and
battery. Defendant asserted the defense of justification because of
plaintiff's use of opprobrious language directed toward him. The
court held that provocative words may be justification for an assault,
provided the person uttering the words understood or should have
understood that physical retaliation would be attempted. The words
2
must be "fighting" words.
The court based its decision, as well as previous ones to the same
effect," on a section of the Louisiana Civil Code, 4 which, as interpreted
by the court prevents one who provokes the difficulty from recovering
damages for the resulting assault.5 The rule was first extended to
' Perhaps the greatest advancement that has been made in commuter and
branch-line equipment to meet the short-haul competition is the Budd RDC-1
(Rail Diesel Car). Each car is capable of carrying ninety passengers and
several cars can be coupled together to make a train. Operating costs are 550
a mile with a two-man crew and 64 a mile with a three-man crew, compared
with $1.80 a mile for a steam locomotive with two cars. The initial cost of a car
is $128,750. The price of three cars with a total seating capacity of 270 would
be $90,000 cheaper than a small diesel locomotive and three standard passenger
cars seating only 162. See Business World, Oct. 22, 1949, p. 22; Popular
Science, Dec. 1949, p. 114.
A problem which is closely related to abandonments of lines and discontinuance of service is that pertaining to the abandonment of railroad stations.
See Utilities Comm'n v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 235 N. C. 273, 69 S. E. 2d
502 (1952) ; Public Service Comm'n v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 72 S. E. 2d
438 (S.C. 1952).

'Smith v. Parker, 59 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 1952).
" ...insulting or 'fighting' words . . .those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Chaplinsky
v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U. S.568, 572 (1942).
"The test is what men of common intelligence would understand would be
words likely to cause an average addressee to fight. . .. Such words, as ordinary
men know are likely to cause a fight." Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire,
supra at 573 (1942).
'Oakes v. H. Weil Baking Co., 174 La. 770, 141 So. 456 (1932); Gross v.
Great A. & P. Tea Co., 25 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 1946) and cases cited therein.
ILA. STAT. ANN. § 2315 (1945) "Every act whatever of man that causes
damage
to another, obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
5
Notes, 14 FoRD. L. REv. 95 (1945) ; 5 LA. L. REv. 617 (1944). The defense
is apparently not an extension of self-defense, but based on the theory that the
plaintiff by opprobrious language, puts himself under a legal disability to recover.
See Gross v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 25 So. 2d 837, 840 (La. App. 1945) ("The
reason is that one who uses words or actions which it may be expected will
bring about an attempt at retaliation has only himself to blame, if as a result
of the attempt at retaliation, he, himself, is injured.") . But see McCurdy v. City
Cab Co., 32 So. 2d 720, 723 (La. App. 1947) ; Ponthieu v. Coco, 18 So. 2d 351,
355 (La. App. 1944). In these cases the court referred to the plaintiffs as the
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allow mere words as provocation in Finkelstein v. Nailaus.6 The
7
Louisiana courts have followed that decision in a number of cases,
and have evidently securely incorporated this extreme facet of a basically
extreme principle into their jurisprudence.8
Three other states, Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia, have criminal
statutes9 which in effect provide that mere words, in the form of abusive
or insulting language, are sufficient to justify the use of force. Alabama refuses to apply its penal statute to civil actions. 10 In Georgia
and Mississippi, however, the criminal statutes have been held to apply
to civil actions. 1 The courts in these two states are not necessarily
extending the statute, but are changing the common law by adopting
the penal policy of the legislature as the policy of the courts in this
type of civil action.' 2 Thus, they hold that under certain conditions,1
aggressors in denying recovery for plaintiff-provoked assaults, indicating at least,
that the court may be thinking of some degree of self-defense as being justified
by the aggression.
' 151 So. 686 (La. App. 1933) ("... the law is clear that, where the plaintiff provokes a difficulty by insults, abuse, threats, or other conduct calculated
to arouse the resentment or fears of the defendant, plaintiff is not entitled to
recover.").
I McCurdy v. City Cab Co., 32 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 1947) ; Gross v. Great
A. & P. Tea Co., 25 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 1946); Ponthieu v. Coco, 181So. 2d
351 (La. App. 1944) [discussed in Note, 14 FoRD. L. REv. 95 (1945) and cases.
cited therein].
To be a defense, however, it has been consistently held that the words must
come reasonably close to or be immediately provocative of the assault. Antleyv. Davis, 199 So. 450 (La. App. 1940).
-It has also been demanded that the words be reasonably provocative and that
the assault not go beyond what is justified. Chisholm v. DeFrances, 27 So. 2d"
467 (La. App. 1946); Randal v. Ridgeley, 185 So. 632 (La. App. 1939).
1 Apparently these cases determined since the decision in Finkelstein v. Nalhaus, 151 So. 686 (La. App. 1933) nullify a series of earlier holdings to the
effect that mere words never constitute a defense. But cf. Beaucoudray v. Hirsch,
49 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 1951) ; Broussard v. Citizen, 44 So. 2d 347 (La. App.
1950), which recent cases seemingly follow the common law rule, holding that
no provocation may be a complete defense. This indicates that the Louisiana
courts are not entirely consistent in their holdings on the point.
'ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 37 (19405 ; GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1409 (1939);
Miss. CODE ANY. § 2525 (1942).
"°Gissendonner v. Temples, 232 Ala. 608, 169 So. 231 (1936); Jones v.
Bynum, 189 Ala. 677, 66 So. 639 (1914); Empire Clothing Co. v. Hammons, 17"
Ala. App. 60, 81 So. 838 (1919).
" Berkner v. Dannenberg, 116 Ga. 954. 43 S.E. 463 (1903) [dissent, adoptedi
in Thompson v. Shelverton, 131 Ga. 714, 63 S. E. 220 (1908)]; Exposition
Cotton Mills v. Crawford, 67 Ga. App. 135, 19 S. E. 2d 835 (1942) ; Holliman
v. Lucas, 202 Miss. 463, 32 So. 2d 259 (1947) ; Woods v. Ill. Cent. Ry., 151 Miss..
395, 118 So. 197 (1928); Choate v. Pierce, 126 Miss. 209, 88 So. 627 (1921)
(holding justified in that "it would be an unusual state of the law to hold that
it was a question for the jury to determine whether insulting words were a
sufficient excuse or justification of a criminal charge of assault and battery,
while in a civil action of the same character that such words were no justifica-.
tion.").
"2 Note, 21 COL. L. REv. 818 (1921).
"SAssault must not be disproportionate to the provocation. Robinson v. DeVaughn, 59 Ga. App. 37, 200 S.E. 213 (1938) ; Coleman v. Yazoo & M. V. Ry.,.
90 Miss. 629, 43 So. 473 (1907).

1952]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

mere words may be sufficient provocation to justify a civil assault and
battery. However, the statutes are not applicable in cases of aggravated
assaults. 14
The courts in the overwhelming majority of the jurisdictions follow the usual common law rule that no language, however abusive,
will justify an assault so long as it is unaccompanied by any overt act. 15
This rule applies also to opprobrious words and epithets which are
grossly insulting or abusive.' 6
While not allowing provocation as a defense, most courts applying
the common law rule do allow words to be shown in mitigation of
damages. The majority view is that provocation may go to mitigate
punitive but not compensatory damages1T while other courts allow
even compensatory damages to be mitigated.' 8
North Carolina has consistently followed the majority view that
the plaintiff who uses insulting language or otherwise invites the assault
by provoking conduct is not barred from recovery. 19 "As in criminal
Provocation by opprobrious words, to justify assault, must be spoken to the
accused, at the time and in the place where the assault takes place. Hutcheson
v. Browning, 34 Ga. App. 276, 129 S. E. 125 (1925); Woods v. Ill. Cent. Ry.,
151 Miss. 395, 118 So. 197 (1928).
"4Suggs v. Anderson, 12 Ga. 461 (1853) (assault upon a female); Thomas
v. Carter,
148 Miss. 637, 114 So. 736 (1927) (assault with a deadly weapon).
5
E. g., Robrback v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 166 Fed. 797 (C. C. E. D. Pa.
1909); Cooper v. Demby, 122 Ark. 266, 183 S. W. 185 (1916); Uptegrove v.
Walker, 222 Mo. App. 758, 7 S. W. 2d 734 (1928); Royal Oak Stave Co. v.
Groce, 113 S. W. 2d 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Goldsmith's Adm'r v. joy,
61 Vt. 488, 17 Atl. 1010 (1889). For collection of cases and text discussion, see
4 Am.. JUR., ASSAULT AND BATTERY § 53 (1936) ; PROSSER, TORTS 127 (1941);
REsTATEmENT,

ToRTs § 69, comment a (1934).

" E. g., Rohrback v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 166 Fed. 797 (C. C. E. D. Pa.
1909); Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Bryeans, 137 Ark. 341, 209 S. W. 69
(1919); Lewis v. Fountain, 168 N. C. 277, 84 S. E. 278 (1915); Daniels v.
Starnes, 61 S. W. 2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
'7 Collier v. Thompson, 180 Ark. 695, 22 S. W. 2d 562 (1929) ; Scott v. Fleming, 16 Ill. App. 539 (1885); Osler v. Walton, 67 N. J. L. 63, 50 Atl. 590
(1901); Mahoning Valley Ry. v. DePascale, 70 Ohio St. 179, 71 N. E. 633
(1904); Ward v. White, 86 Va. 212, 9 S. E. 1021 (1889).
For collection of

cases see Note, 63 A. L. R. 890 (1929) ; 1

SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES,

460 (1916).

To be considered in mitigation of damages, it is generally required that the
provocation be given at the time of the assault or reasonably close thereto.
Keiser v. Smith, 71 Ala. 481 (1882) ; Cummins v. Crawford, 88 Ill. 312 (1878) ;
Lee v. Woolsey, 19 Johns. 319 (N. Y. 1832); 1 SEDowicx, DAMAGES 749 (9th
ed. 1920).
"8Smith v. Davis, 76 Ga. App. 154, 45 S. E. 2d 237 (1947); Bascomny v.
Hoffman, 199 Iowa 941, 203 N. W. 273 (1925); Jackson v. Old Colony St. Ry.,
206 Mass. 477, 92 N. E. 725 (1910); Genuing v. Baldwin, 77 App. Div. 584,
79 N. Y. Supp. 569 (3d Dep't 1902) ; Robinson v. Rupert, 23 Pa. St. 523 (1854) ;
Evans v. Bryan, 24 Tenn. App. 405, 145 S. W. 2d 557 (1940); Richards v.
Westmoreland, 63 S. W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Mecham v. Foley, 235
P. 2d 497 (Utah 1951).
" Lewis v. Fountain, 168 N. C. 277, 84 S. E. 278 (1915) ; Palmer v. WinstonSalem Ry. & Elect. Co., 131 N. C. 250, 42 S. E. 604 (1902); Williams v. Gill,
122 N. C. 967, 29 S. E. 879 (1898).
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actions, no words, however violent or insulting, justify a blow.... "20
However, on the question of mitigation of damages, the North Carolina court is not so clear. Four cases state that provocation may be
shown in evidence to mitigate the damages, 21 without expressly indicating what type damages may be mitigated.
Therefore, only three jurisdictions allow words to justify an assault:
Louisiana under its civil code, and Georgia and Mississippi under their
respective penal codes. Although these states have seemingly attained

good results from the justification rule, there appears to be no tendency on the part of other jurisdictions to adopt the policy. Those
states following the strict common law rule have reached equally good

results by allowing provocation to go in mitigation of both punitive
andl actual damages.
As a matter of policy, the mitigation theory is probably best. It
is said that this results in an illogical position, whereby the court allows
provocation to be a defense by indirection while not permitting such
directly.22 It is also said that peace and good order forbid that individuals shall right their own wrongs.23 But, these platitudes fail
when applied to the actual application of the rule.
Under the mitigation rule, the case goes to the jury on the question
of damages as well as questions of fact. The jury weighs the evidence
and tetermines what damages should be assessed in view of the degree
of provocation, mitigating even actual damages if provocation seems
very great, just as they allow punitive damages when the provocation
is very slight. A plaintiff will then be less apt to seek damages for
an assault which he provoked, while a defendant will be unable to have
a defense in language which would anger only the hypersensitive.
THOMAS L. YOUNG.
oLewis v. Fountain, 168 N. C. 277, 279, 84 S. E. 278, 279 (1915).
"Lewis v. Fountain,

supra note 20; Palmer v. Winston-Salem Ry. & Elect.
Co., 131 N. C. 250, 42 S. E. 604 (1902); Bell v. Hansley, 48 N. C. (3 Jones)
131 (1855) ; Barry v. Inglis, 1 N. C. (1 Tayl. 121) 163 (1799).
However, dictum in Palmer v. Winston-Salem Ry. & Elect. Co., supra at
251, 42 S. E. at 604, apparently indicates that provocation can be shown to
mitigate even compensatory damages.

"Note, 3 NoTRE
"Tisdale

DAME LAW. 332 (1938).
v. State, 199 Ind. 1, 2, 154 N. E. 801, 802 (1927).

